Inefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-Based Evidence from Meiji Japan by Weese, Eric et al.
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Discussion Papers Economic Growth Center 
8-1-2015 
Inefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-Based Evidence 




Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series 
Recommended Citation 
Weese, Eric; Hayashi, Masayoshi; and Nishikawa, Masashi, "Inefficiency and Self-Determination: 
Simulation-Based Evidence from Meiji Japan" (2015). Discussion Papers. 1058. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/1058 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an 
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, 




ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
P.O. Box 208269 






Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 1050 
 
Inefficiency and Self-Determination:  






University of Tokyo 
 
Masashi Nishikawa 
Aoyama Gakuin University 
 
Notes:  Center discussion papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical 
comments.  
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper 
Collection:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2651855.  
 
Inefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-based
evidence from Meiji Japan*
Eric Weese† Masayoshi Hayashi‡ Masashi Nishikawa§
August 2015
Abstract
Does the exercise of the right of self-determination lead to inefficiency? This paper
considers a set of centrally planned municipal mergers during the Meiji period, with
data from Gifu prefecture. The observed merger pattern can be explained as a social
optimum based on a very simple individual utility function. If individual villages
had been allowed to choose their merger partners, counterfactual simulations show
that the core is always non-empty, but core partitions contain about 80% more (post-
merger) municipalities than the social optimum. Simulations are possible because core
partitions can be calculated using repeated application of a mixed integer program.
Does exercise of the right to self-determination result in an efficient arrangement of polit-
ical boundaries? There is substantial theoretical interest in this issue both inside and outside
of economics, and recent world events, such as the Russian annexation of the (apparently
consenting) Crimean peninsula, suggest policy relevance.1 Empirical results regarding the
efficiency of jurisdiction formation, however, are very limited.
This paper considers a historical set of municipal mergers in Gifu, Japan, that were
decided by a central planner in the late 19th century. We show that the observed pattern of
*Portions of this paper were originally presented as “An Errors-in-Variables Model for Graph Outcome
Data” at the Econometric Society Far East meeting. In addition, some ideas were present in the job market
paper version of Weese [2015], but were removed during the publication process. We thank seminar partic-
ipants at various seminars. In addition, the paper has benefitted greatly from discussion with Steve Berry,
Jeremy Fox, Hide Ichimura, Yuichi Kitamura, Tsunetoshi Mizoguchi, Kei Okunuki, and Larry Samuelson.
Julien Clancy provided excellent research assistance with an earlier version of the model. Portions of this
research were conducted at Kobe University, Osaka University, the University of Tokyo, and the National
Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. Funding was provided by the Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science. Computation was performed using the FAS High Performance Computing system at Yale.
†Yale University, eric.weese@yale.edu (corresponding author)
‡University of Tokyo
§Aoyama Gakuin University
1Additional recent episodes include the 2014 independence referendum in Scotland and the 2014 inde-
pendence non-referendum in Catalonia. The 1995 independence referendum in Quebec is a somewhat earlier
example. Alesina and Spolaore [2003] provide an extensive theoretical treatment.
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new municipal boundaries corresponds reasonably well to that of a social planner maximizing
a sum of utilities of individuals in an extremely simple model: there is a tradeoff between
efficiencies of scale in the provision of public goods, and geographic heterogeneity in the
jurisdiction in which the public goods are provided. The parameter governing this tradeoff
is estimated using a standard “measurement error only” model of the form suggested in Pakes
[2010], and a parameter describing the efficiencies of scale is calibrated using additional data.
A counterfactual case is then considered, where pre-defined subunits corresponding to
feudal villages were allowed to choose how to arrange themselves into jurisdictions in a
coalition formation game without transfers. The core is used as the solution concept in this
decentralized jurisdiction formation game, and results are obtained via simulation. The first
result is that the core is non-empty, given the actual data and parameter estimates. This is
not obvious theoretically, and there are well-known simple examples (e.g. Gale and Shapley
[1962]) where the core is empty in a one-sided matching game. Despite these potential
theoretical difficulties with the “right to self-determination” as operationalized in this paper,
empirically there are always outcomes that satisfy the relevant conditions.
Furthermore, in one case the partitions in the core are very close to the partition that
would be selected by the social planner: this is the case where the data is modified so
that all players in the coalition formation game have the same per capita tax base. If
there is “horizontal” heterogeneity among players, but no “vertical” ranking, it thus appears
that allowing jurisdiction boundaries to be established by a decentralized process results in
minimal inefficiency.
In contrast, when the actual data regarding per capita tax base is used, core partitions
involve about two-thirds more coalitions than the social planner’s preferred partition. This is
because each player in the coalition formation game would prefer to merge with others that
are richer than themselves, while avoiding poorer players. The resulting lack of mutually
desirable mergers results in coalition sizes being substantially smaller than those that the
social planner would select.
Even more problematic decentralized partitions appear in the case where municipalities
are receiving some sort of equalization payment from the national government. We consider
stylized versions of equalization systems actually used in later periods in Japan. One of these
systems turns out to improve the quality of decentralized partitions, making them very close
to the social planner’s preferred partition, but another results in about four times as many
coalitions forming as the social planner would choose. A back of the envelope calculation
suggests that this could translate into inefficiency equivalent to several percent of GDP.
As modern states are frequently characterized by elaborate systems of fiscal transfers, this
result suggests why attempted decentralized municipal mergers are frequently regarded as
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unsuccessful, with mandated boundary changes instead employed by central authorities.
Two methodological contributions are made in the process of obtaining these empirical
results. Both of these are related to the finite but unenumerably large number of coalitions
that can be formed when there are a large number of subunits being arranged into political
jurisdictions.
Empirical work in many fields, including political economy, is generally expected to in-
clude estimates with alternative specifications and additional variables.2 As is often the case
with data regarding the formation of political jurisdictions, however, there is a shortage of
strong instruments in the data set used. This paucity of instruments means that including
additional control variables in the main moment inequality specification results in confidence
sets widening dramatically, and in some cases becoming unbounded.
In order to allow for alternative specifications to be considered with additional control
variables, we consider estimators based on additional distributional assumptions. These esti-
mators produce results suggest that geographic heterogeneity was indeed far more important
in determining the political boundaries chosen than religious, agricultural, historical, or other
sorts of heterogeneity. The additional estimators thus provide justification for the preferred
specification.
A second methodological contribution concerns the computation of core partitions in
the case where there are an unenumerably large number of coalitions. An iterative approach
using myopic deviations is employed, with each successive deviation computed using a mixed
integer program. The coalition formation game in Gifu consists of approximately 1000
players: we compute core partitions in a few hours using standard equipment.
This paper is inspired by Desmet, Breton, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber [2011], who consider
European national boundaries as a coalition formation game. Desmet et al. use solution
concepts that are more restrictive than the core in order to theoretically guarantee the
existence of a stable partition, and then obtain parameters via a bounding exercise. They
then conduct counterfactual simulations using exhaustive enumeration. In contrast, this
paper uses the core as the solution concept, obtains parameters via moment inequalities and
related estimation techniques, and conducts simulations without enumerating the possible
outcomes. The data used in Desmet et al. [2011] differs from that considered in this paper,
however, in that their data shows the outcome of a decentralized coalition formation game,
rather than a partition chosen by the central planner. Using boundaries chosen by the
central planner as the basis for parameter estimation dramatically simplifies some aspects
of the estimation problem.3
2Two well known examples here would be Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby [2004] and Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly [1999].
3Issues regarding multiple equilibria, for example, are difficult to avoid when the data comes from a
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A number of other papers consider formal approaches to parameter estimation in the case
of coalition formation games. These include Brasington [1999], Gordon and Knight [2009],
and Weese [2015].4 The techniques presented in this paper for estimation would require at
minimum substantial modification before they were appropriate for use in that situation.
On the other hand, the estimators used in each of the three papers just mentioned rely on
specific properties of the dataset that they consider, and thus none of them are applicable
to the ostensibly simpler discrete choice problem considered below.
Within the discrete choice literature, Fox [2010] considers the “rank order property”,
which if satisfied would allow for parameter estimation in discrete choice models using only
a subset of the choices, via maximum score estimation. One of the estimators considered in
this paper is in fact implemented as a smoothed maximum score estimator, although this
has a different theoretical basis than the estimator proposed by Fox.5
There is also an extremely extensive literature on two-sided matching. Stability properties
in these models guarantee the existence of stable partitions, and algorithms such as the
deferred acceptance algorithm allow for easy computation of these partitions. Unfortunately,
two-sided matching markets are fundamentally different than models with only one type of
player, and these results do not appear to be applicable to coalition formation problems of
the type considered in this paper.
This paper appears to be the first empirical study of municipal mergers in Meiji Japan.
Previous work on more recent Japanese municipal mergers includes Hirota and Yunoue
[2014], Miyazaki [2014], and Weese [2015]. The techniques used and results obtained in
these papers differ substantially from those presented below.6
The remainder of this paper has the following structure: Section 1 presents the theoretical
decentralized coalition formation game, but disappear when a central planner (with strict preferences) has
chosen the outcome.
4Brasington [1999] uses a bivariate probit with partial observability, but does not explicitly specify how
the observed partition was formed. Gordon and Knight [2009] use a simulation GMM estimator with data
that contains pairwise mergers. Parameter estimation in Weese [2015] relies on special financial merger
incentive policies of a known form, combined with substantial auxiliary data.
5Most other modern discrete choice models using only a subset of the choices have very specific data
requirements, not satisfied in the dataset used. These requirements would likely not be satisfied by most
other datasets describing changes in political jurisdictions, and thus an appropriate estimation technique for
data of this sort appears not to be currently available.
6Hirota and Yunoue [2014] uses a logit framework to look at political determinants of mergers. Miyazaki
[2014] uses data on municipal referenda. Weese [2015] considers recent Japanese data where the central gov-
ernment provides equalization payments to municipalities. Inefficiency in this environment arises due to the
presence of asymmetric information regarding the benefits of potential mergers. The observed equalization
payments in this recent data are extremely large (up to 25% of GDP per capita for the smallest municipali-
ties), and counterfactuals where there are no such payments are thus so far out of sample that there would
be computational difficulties with any such simulation, as well as theoretical difficulties in interpreting the
results.
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model, Section 2 describes the econometric model, Section 3 introduces the data used, Section
4 discusses the estimation results, Section 5 covers the counterfactual simulations performed,
and Section 6 concludes.
1 Model
Let there be N players, each of whom needs to receive local government services. Player i
has income yi, and an inelastic demand for pi units of services.7 A coalition m of players can
provide P units of municipal services to themselves at a cost of
c(P ) = γ1 + γ2P (1)
The interesting case is the one where γ1 > 0, as then the average cost per unit of service
declines as more players are added to a coalition. In this case, the situation is that of a club
good with congestibility. There is no quality dimension to the services provided, and the









Other than the proportional taxation at τm, there is no redistribution or other transfers
within a coalition.8 For a given municipality m, there is no choice regarding the tax rate τm
as it is determined by the budget constraint.
In addition to the amount of taxes paid, players care about the identity of their coalition
partners. The setup is thus that of a hedonic coalition formation game as described in Bo-
gomolnaia and Jackson [2002].9 Following Desmet et al. [2011], players experience disutility
proportional to the average distance between them and their coalition partners. Specifically,
the utility of player i in coalition m is given by
uim = L(i,m)βyi − τmyi (3)
7In the empirical application below, a player will correspond to a feudal village, and p will be taken to
be the population of the village.
8In the coalition formation literature, coalitions are often denoted by S, and the use of m instead is
unusual notation. The coalitions in question here are municipalities, and m is used for consistency with the
notation in the econometric model.
9This is the hedonic game originally considered in Dreze and Greenberg [1980], except without transfers
of any sort.
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i′∈m yi′ , and ℓii′ is the distance between i and i′.10 A slightly unusual feature of
this specification is that richer players suffer greater disutility from distance. If the distances
in question are geographic, then this could be due to a greater time cost of travel for those
with higher incomes.11
For the model in this section, and for the counterfactual simulations later on, distance
will be taken to be geographic distance. However, when estimating parameters, we will also
consider more complicated specifications where other sorts of distances are also included.12
Let π ∈ Π be a partition of players into coalitions, where Π is the set of all possible

















ℓii′yiyi′ + γ1|π| (6)
(7)
where uiπ indicates the utility that player i receives from whatever coalition it belongs to
in partition π. In the case where ℓ is always either 0 or 1, the first term in Equation 5 is
YmHm, where Hm is the Herfindahl index (weighted by tax base y). The intuition for the
social planner’s problem is clearly visible in Equation 5: the tradeoff facing the planner is
between the first term (heterogeneity within each municipality m), and the second term (the
fixed cost of running |π| municipalities). The variable cost γ2 does not appear in Equation
5. This is because there are always
∑N
i=1 pi units of municipal service demanded, regardless
10This form of L is based on Greenberg [1956], as extended by Lieberson [1964]. It differs from the
“distance to policy” heterogeneity cost used in Alesina and Spolaore [1997] and subsequent papers. Earlier
work includes Greenberg and Weber [1986]. A literature review is provided in Donder, Breton, and Peluso
[2012].
11This specification has the additional benefits that it will better match the data used, and makes compu-
tation of core partitions substantially easier. In addition to better matching the observed mergers, a major
advantage of this specification is that empirically the players will be feudal villages, containing multiple
households with different levels of y. The preferences described in Equation 4 lead to all of these households
having the same preferences over mergers: to see this, divide the equation by y. Thus, the specific form
chosen allows us to ignore within-village heterogeneity.
12In this case, β and L would become vectors, and each distance would be calculated following Equation 4,
using ℓaii′ , ℓbii′ , and so forth. These distances would then enter additively in the utility function in Equation
3.
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of the partition chosen.
This optimal partition πFB is generically unique. A well-known special case is where ℓ
are given by euclidean squared distances, determined by players locations on some plane.
In the limiting case, where the the players are tiny, uniformly distributed on the plane,
and otherwise identical, the optimal partition is given by a regular hexagonal tiling. This
was first discussed in the “central place theory” of Christaller [1933].13 In general, however,
there is no closed-form solution for the optimal partition, and it must be computed via some
combinatorial optimization technique.
Our interest is in comparing πFB with partitions that would form in the case of a de-
centralized coalition formation game. Intuition suggests that partitions resulting from a
decentralized coalition formation process will have coalitions that are on average smaller
than those that would be selected by the social planner. Players at the “edge” of a coalition
are experiencing high disutility from distance, and at the same time are being charged a
tax rate τ determined by the total cost of providing services, rather than the marginal cost.
These are the players that are most likely to deviate, and the incentives that they are faced
with are different and more conducive to splitting than the objective being maximized by
the social planner.
Any verification of this intuition, however, first requires a formalization of the concept
of a “right to self-determination”. This appears to be well represented as a formal solution
concept by the core. In the coalition formation game without transfers considered in this
paper, the core is
Π∗ = {π|∀S ′ /∈ π, ∃i ∈ S ′ s.t. uiπ ≥ uiS′}. (8)
There is the possibility that Π∗ is empty, and a substantial amount of work has been de-
voted to finding conditions under which the non-emptiness of Π∗ is guaranteed. These con-
ditions include “consecutiveness” [Greenberg and Weber, 1986], “intermediate preferences”
[Demange, 1994], and the “top coalition property” [Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez, 2001],
among many others.14 In general, the results in this literature have been mostly negative: it
is difficult to find conditions under which the core is guaranteed to be non-empty, and even
more difficult to define these conditions in such a way that they can be easily checked. In
this paper we will ignore this issue, and instead show below that core partitions exist given
13Drèze, Le Breton, Savvateev, and Weber [2008] provides extensive citations regarding hexagonal tiling
results. The efficient partition will be stable in this case because any deviation to a larger hexagon would be
opposed by those at the edge of the deviation, and any deviation to a smaller hexagon would be opposed by
those at the center of the hexagons in the efficient partition. However, the core is very large here, and thus
depending on how it is determined which partition from the core actually occurs, substantial inefficiency
could result.
14Banerjee et al. [2001] provides a detailed literature review.
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our data and parameter estimates.15
2 Estimation Strategy
The observed outcome is a partition of N players into coalitions, chosen by a central planner.
Estimation of the parameters of a structural model where the outcome takes this sort of par-
tition form presents substantial difficulties. As any structural model proposed is extremely
unlikely to explain the observed outcome perfectly, an error term of some sort needs to be
included as part of the data generating process. The number of possible coalitions, however,
is very large: with N players, there are 2N − 1 potential coalitions. The total number of
possible partitions of players into coalitions is given by the Bell numbers, and grows even
more quickly in N .
A model that includes an idiosyncratic term for each of these possible mergers will lead
to some potential mergers having extremely positive idiosyncratic shocks. This causes prob-
lems similar to those discussed in Berry and Pakes [2007], where an increasing number of
products results in consumer utility increasing without bound if there is an idiosyncratic
shock representing “taste for products”. The situation here, however, has an additional fea-
ture that makes a “taste for products” approach particularly unattractive: the number of
potential coalitions is a function of the size of the coalition: there are N coalitions of size 1,





coalitions of size k. The total number of coalitions
is thus non-monotonic in k.16 To simplify discussion, consider the case where coalitions
are generally smaller than N/2. In this region, the total number of coalitions of size k is
increasing in k. If idiosyncratic shocks are uncorrelated, some of the larger coalitions will
then have positive shocks much larger than those of any of the smaller coalitions.
If the correlation structure of the error term were misspecified such that the true cor-
relation were underestimated, estimates for other parameters from this specification would
generally be biased such that only the smallest mergers appeared attractive from a structural
perspective, and the explanation for larger observed configurations would be that these were
mergers with very positive idiosyncratic shocks. Conversely, if the model of the correlation
structure were incorrect such that the correlation in the idiosyncratic term between partitions
were overestimated, then the opposite bias in estimates of other parameters would occur:
15Gregorini [2009] shows that obtaining theoretical results for the more general case where there is variation
in both income and ideal points will be difficult because of non-existence problems. The empirical results
below will show that, however, for the actually observed data and estimated parameters, there is no non-
existence problem. Furthermore, horizontal heterogeneity alone results in only minimal inefficiency; however,
substantial inefficiency occurs when there is both horizontal and vertical heterogeneity.
16There are only N coalitions of size 1, only N coalitions of size N − 1, and only one coalition of size N ,
but there are many coalitions of an intermediate size.
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parameter estimates would suggest that larger mergers were very desirable, and that the
smaller mergers that were observed occurred because of very positive idiosyncratic shocks.
From a theoretical perspective, a correctly specified correlation structure for the id-
iosyncratic shocks would eliminate the problem just discussed, and any standard estimation
technique could be employed. From a practical perspective, even if it were possible to model
the correlation structure of the idiosyncratic shock correctly, estimators of this sort tend
to involve high dimensional integrals and are not computationally feasible.17 This paper
proposes an alternative solution to this problem, based on an errors-in-variables framework.
There are no other idiosyncratic shocks, however, apart from this measurement error: the
model is a “measurement error only” model. Models of this sort have a long history in
econometrics [Morgan, 1990], and have seen recent application in moment-inequality models
[Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii, 2015].
Motivated by the data available, we assume that most covariates are potentially measured
with error. “Standard” instruments do not appear to be of much use. The implausibility of
these instruments is not a special feature of the particular data used, but rather a general
characteristic of political jurisdiction formation data.18
As the central planner was assumed to be Benthamite in Section 1, simplify notation by
17There are a few specific forms for the idiosyncratic shock that might make estimation feasible, but these
forms appear unlikely to match whatever shocks are actually present in the data. Logit models, which are
valid even when considering only a subset of the choices, are not appropriate because the IIA assumption is
obviously violated.
18Specifically, “lagged variable” instruments are implausible because recent innovations are not of partic-
ular interest: political boundaries are changed rarely, and any lagged measurement will include a correlated
error of exactly the sort that needs to be avoided. “Neighbouring market” instruments turn out to be ex-
tremely weak, because even when clearly defined “markets” for mergers do exist, most variation is within
market, as each merger market generally includes both a central city and its rural hinterland (this phe-
nomenon is illustrated in Table 1 of Weese [2015], where a division of prefectures into “rural”, “mixed”, and
“metropolitan” results in just over 75% of prefectures being classified as “mixed”). Finally, geographic or
climatic variables are non-excludable: in the dataset considered, the central planner was explicitly directed
to consider geographic distance, and casual inspection of any random selection of maps suggests that the
importance of geography in Gifu is not an unusual feature in the design of political boundaries. A potential
objection here is that the difficulty in finding instruments means that researchers in this area simply need
to work harder in order to find a dataset that does have appropriate instrumental variables. The problem
here is that both the number and size of datasets concerning political jurisdictions is sharply limited. Even
large countries sometimes only have a few thousand jurisdictions at the lowest level, and there are simply
not that many large countries in the world. Randomized experiments are basically unheard of, and quasi-
experimental variation is difficult to find because the policy decisions made often result in precisely the sort
of endogeneity that needs to be avoided. It is important to develop econometric approaches suitable for the











Define X∗πFC to be equal to γ1|π|, the second term in Equation 5. This is the fixed cost of
running the |π| municipalities present in partition π. As discussed in Section 1, the variable
cost is not identified, and thus we do not create a XπVC variable.
Next, define X∗πD to be the (distance) heterogeneity experienced in partition π. This is

















where β0 is the true value of β. The econometrician does not observe X∗, but instead sees
Xπ = X
∗
π + ηπ, (13)
where ηπ is a measurement error vector.19 Estimation will be based on based on comparing
the characteristics of the observed partition, Xπ0 , to the characteristics of another partition,
Xπ′ , for many possible alternative partitions π′.20 As we are interested in the differences in
19This matches the form of the payoffs given in Equation 3 if population (which determines τm) and tax
bases yim are measured without error, and X∗ is interpreted to be data giving the distances L(i,m). The
model thus assumes that the distances are measured with error, not whatever underlying variables generate
the distances. If the latter were the case, additional work would be required to explain the distributional
assumption that will introduced shortly: under certain circumstances the error term could still be normally
distributed, but the model in general becomes more complex.
20When thinking about these alternative partitions π′, we will generally have in mind partitions such as
π′ = {(π0 \ {m1,m2}) ∪ {m1 ∪m2}}, with m1,m2 ∈ π0, (14)
where one additional merger has taken place, or
π′ = {(π0 \ {m′1 ∪m′2}) ∪ {m′1,m′2}}, with m′1 ∪m′2 ∈ π0, (15)
where there has been one fewer. There is nothing specific in the model that requires these sorts of alternative
partitions to be considered, but the assumptions used to calculate standard errors for β̂ will appear more
reasonable with these alternative partitions.
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characteristics between partitions π′ and π0, let
X̃π′ = Xπ′ −Xπ0 (16)
denote this difference, with X̃∗π′ and η̃∗π′ defined similarly. Note that
X̃∗π′β
0 ≤ 0 (17)
for all π′ ∈ Π, because the central planner chose π0 optimally based on Equation 5.
If β has even moderate length, and the only variables assumed to be measured without
error are population P , tax base y, and the observed partition π0, then a standard moment
inequalities approach will not result in acceptably narrow confidence sets for β. We thus
consider some additional potential assumptions, beginning with the least plausible:
Assumption 1.
a) X̃∗π′ is distributed uniformly on a half-sphere satisfying Inequality 17.
b) η̃π′ ∼ N(0, σ2I), i.i.d.
Here neither Assumption 1.a nor Assumption 1.b appears particularly reasonable. We






This equivalent to a probit model with covariates X̃ and an outcome variable equal to 0
for all observations. As X̃ does not contain any constant column, this is a probit model
without an intercept term. The intuition is that each alternative partition π′ could have
been selected, but was not, and each row of X̃ gives the characteristics X̃π′ comparing that
partition to π0. If there were a π′ that appeared to have identical characteristics to π0, then
this partition must have X̃π′ = 0. There thus cannot be an intercept term.
The probit has been used extensively, with assorted variations, in the empirical literature
examining political jurisdiction formation.22 We consider this model both because it provides
a link with the existing empirical literature, and because, despite requiring assumptions that
21This is a pseudo-likelihood estimator because the likelihood is 1c
∫
S
f(X̃∗ − X̃)dX̃∗, where S is the half-
sphere, c is a normalizing constant, and f is the multivariate standard normal density. If the region of




ϕ(w − X̃β)dw, but it is not. In either case, σ will not be recovered correctly.
22Examples include Brasington [1999]...
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strain credibility, the estimates produced turn out to be surprisingly similar to those from
the models that will be considered below.23
Assumption 1 is not very satisfying. We thus continue by considering the following:
Assumption 2.
a) X̃∗π′ is distributed on a bounded region satisfying Inequality 17.
b) η̃π′ ∼ N(0, σ2I), i.i.d.
Here the assumption regarding the distribution of X̃∗ is more pleasant, but the uncom-
fortable assumption regarding the distribution of η̃ remains. This is the same assumption
that appears in the total least squares literature, and is undesirable because estimates will
depend on the units in which the data is expressed.24





has a distribution that is a convolution of FX̃∗|β0 and a N(0, σ2||β0||2) distribution. Write
this as
FX̃β0 = FX̃∗β0 ∗N(0, σ
2||β0||2) (20)
where ∗ is the convolution operator. This suggests an estimator using the empirical distribu-
tion F̄X̃β to calculate via deconvolution an estimated distribution F̂X̃∗β, and then verify that
in fact this distribution satisfies Assumption 2.a. Deconvolution is a challenging problem,
particularly when the errors are “supersmooth”, which is the case for normally distributed
errors.25 A direct approach via inverting the characteristic function runs into severe difficul-
ties. We first consider an approach based on a deconvoluting kernel estimator.
Fan [1992] proposes an estimator for the deconvolution problem with normal noise, based
on kernel density estimation using a normal kernel. Kernel density estimation involves a con-
volution of the kernel with the distribution of interest, and deconvolution and convolution
are inverse operations. Thus, the resulting deconvoluting kernel has the same form as the
normal kernel used for density estimation, albeit with a bandwidth calculated very differ-
ently. Starting with a standard normal kernel, Fan [1992] shows that the corresponding
23Often empirical papers provide OLS estimates, even though OLS appears clearly inappropriate. We offer
probit estimates in a similar spirit.
24A variety of solutions have been proposed, including Samuelson [1942]. Markovsky and Van Huffel [2007]
provides a recent overview of the literature.
















where hn is the deconvolution bandwidth, and σ20 is the variance of the error. In our case,
σ20 = σ
2||β||2.
This deconvoluting kernel is only appropriate in the case where the errors are “small”, and
Fan [1992] defines “small” in a way that shrinks with the sample size, meaning that at some
sufficiently large sample size the errors will cease to be small. A discussion of asymptotic
properties is thus not really appropriate.26
In the deconvolution literature, estimators that are not consistent are often considered
because they appear to have better finite sample properties than those that are consistent
[Carroll and Hall, 2004]. The Fan [1992] estimator is of particular interest because it turns
out to be very close to the maximum score estimator [Manski, 1975]. The deconvoluting
kernel in Equation 21 can be used to produce an estimate F̂X̃∗β for any β. The restriction





The condition for identification is quite natural: any hyperplane other than that described by
β0 must have some of the support of X̃∗ on both sides of the hyperplane.27 For computation,





. For a given h̃, the estimate F̂X̃∗β(0) takes a form equivalent to that of the








An obvious problem here is that σ20 is unknown; however, any choice for h̃ corresponds to
some choice of deconvolution bandwidth hn, given the actual σ20. Thus, choosing h̃ arbitrarily
gives a deconvolution estimator of the form of Equation 21, albeit with a suboptimal choice
of hn. The resulting estimator is extremely close in terms of implementation to a smoothed
26It might be possible to construct a sequence of estimators that uses the deconvoluting kernel in Equation
21 initially before switching to another approach, such as the deconvolution that follows Assumption 3. We
do not pursue this argument, as it seems unlikely to provide useful results.
27This would be satisfied, for example, if the support of X̃∗ includes a half-sphere around the origin.
Intuitively, the support needs to include points where the central planner is almost indifferent between
choosing π′ and π0.
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maximum score estimator, although the interpretation of the smoothing is very different.
An estimate of σ20 is not obtained, and a normalization of β is required.28
It is useful to compare this estimator to one that has desirable asymptotic properties.
For this, consider a standard deconvolution approach. The assumptions needed in this case
are
Assumption 3.
a) X̃∗π′ is distributed on a bounded region satisfying Inequality 17.
b) η̃π′ ∼ N(0,Σ), i.i.d.
Consider a sieve estimation approach [Grenander, 1981] for producing an estimate of the
univariate distribution F̂X̃∗β0 . This is slightly non-standard, but will lead to a minimum-
distance style estimator, and is substantially easier than estimating the multidimensional
distribution F̂X̃∗ . As with the maximum score style estimator of Equation 22, FX̃∗β0(0) = 1.
The simplest sieve estimator for FX̃∗β0 is a step function with J steps, where J would grow
with the sample size. Let this estimator be F̂ qX̃∗β0 , where q is a length J vector of quantiles









where σ2 = βTΣβ, and Q is some minimum distance statistic.29 This is easily computable
once the normalization ||β||2 = 1 is imposed.30 Finally, and as our main specification, we
consider the case where only the standard assumptions required for a moment inequality
approach are imposed:
Assumption 4.
a) X̃∗π′ is distributed on a bounded region satisfying Inequality 17.
b) η̃π′ is distributed with mean zero conditional on the instruments.
28Assumption 2.b suggests the normalization ||β||2 = 1, but we find that
∑
i |βi| = 1 gives better results,
and thus use that normalization instead.
29We use the Anderson-Darling test statistic.
30Kneip, Simar, and Van Keilegom [2015] provide a method for problems of this type, but unfortunately
it does not appear to be applicable in this case because the “boundary” is at X∗β = 0, whereas in Kneip
et al. [2015] it is positive.
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The instruments we will use are population p and tax base y.31 We consider moments
based on the restriction
E[X̃β0] =E[X̃∗β0 + η̃]
=E[X̃∗β0] + 0 (25)
≤0
which follows from Assumption 4.32 We use moments that correspond to subsets of the
data.33
3 Data
We use data from Gifu Prefecture in Japan. During the Meiji period, a set of munici-
pal mergers (the Meiji Daigappei) were mandated by the central government as part of
its modernization policies: prefectural and national officials acted as a central planner, in
Gifu drawing new boundaries such that 1090 historical feudal villages were grouped into 288
modern western-style municipalities.34 Mergers occurred across the country, mainly in the
1880s and 90s, and are described in more detail in the introduction to Appendix C. We
concentrate on Gifu because high quality data on covariates is only available for that prefec-
ture. The main advantage of historical data is that it better matches the simple theoretical
model presented in Section 1. The precise form of this model turns out to be important: in
Section 5, we will show how it makes it computationally feasible to perform counterfactual
simulations of a decentralized coalition formation game.
The main dataset for covariates is the Gifu-ken Chouson Ryakushi (GKCR) of 1881 and
31The definition of η̃π′ includes π0, and thus π0 is also implicitly being used as an instrument here. This is
valid because there is no payoff relevant idiosyncratic shock in the model, and measurement error η is mean
zero even after conditioning on the partition chosen by the central planner.
32Empirically, some scaling of X̃ is necessary. We choose to scale the columns of X̃ so that their mean
absolute values are equal.
33Specifically, the inequalities just described should hold for municipalities regardless of their population,
but savings due to efficiencies of scale are different at different sizes. Consider small (< 800), medium (1600
- 2400), and large (2400-) municipalities separately. Similarly, the inequalities should also hold for various
levels of wealth: consider municipalities with a low koku rating (<2000) and a high koku rating (>2000)
separately. Finally, consider those municipalities in particularly rural areas, as indicated by the presence of
mountains, separate from those municipalities in the flatter central areas.
34There are approximately 1.33 × 102134 possible ways to partition 1090 objects, and imposing plausible
restrictions does not reduce this number sufficiently so as to allow enumeration of all possible outcomes.
This difficulty motivates both the estimation strategy discussed in Section 2 and the simulation strategy
that will be presented in Section 5.
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Figure 1: Feudal villages, Gifu Prefecture, 1881
Figure 2: Municipalities, Gifu Prefecture, 1897
related documents.35 This covers the southern portion of Gifu, describing 1111 feudal villages
that were combined to form 286 western-style municipalities.36 The initial boundaries of
these villages from the GKCR are shown in Figure 1, and the boundaries after the mergers
are shown in Figure 2.37
35The GKCR was originally digitized by Skinner [1988], but he does not appear to have used it in published
work. The GKCR version used is courtesy of Tsunetoshi Mizoguchi and Kei Okunuki, based on an original
version at the Skinner Data Archive. A bilingual codebook is available in Mizoguchi [2004].
36There is a lengthy debate in the domestic Japanese literature regarding the exact definition of a shizen
son, and the approach used in this paper is necessarily a simplification. Yamaoka [1977] provides detailed
examples.
37The post merger boundaries are based on official 1919 municipal boundaries provided by the Ministry
of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. Two mergers and one split that occurred in 1903-05 were
reversed (the next boundary change did not occur until 1921). The boundaries shown in Figure 2 are thus
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To match the model to the data, let the players be the feudal villages (shizen son), and
let pi be the population of village i. Income is taken to be the koku rating of the village:
these ratings converted all production in a village into common units of rice, for the purpose
of taxation. For population, we use the figures reported in the GKCR. Migration does
not appear to have been that substantial in Gifu during the period in question, although
substantial urbanization was occurring elsewhere in Japan. The GKCR includes data on
migration: only 0.8% of individuals were classified as migrants.38
Figure 3: Population Density
Figure 3 shows the population density of feudal villages. Villages with higher population
density have municipalities with smaller surface area, while those areas with lower population
density have jurisdictions with larger area. This pattern follows the “size density hypothesis”
of Stephan [1977], which has been subjected to considerable study outside of economics.39
The pattern appears to hold across a wide selection of countries, and varieties of jurisdictions
Stephan [1984].40 In terms of economic theory, the observed pattern is consistent with the
model presented above, in which there are efficiencies of scale in the provision of services that
are provided at a single point, combined with some distance cost.41 This pattern continues
those of 1897, except for one minor boundary adjustment that does not affect any calculations. The most
comprehensive list of municipal changes appears to be that maintained by M. Higashide at http://uub.jp/.
For Gifu, we cross-checked these with the Gifu-ken Chouson Gappeishi.
38This classification is based on honseki, which should capture all individuals that migrated, and possibly
also children of migrants.
39The pattern does not appear to be due to measurement error: this possibility was discussed in Vining,
Yang, and Yeh [1979] and Stephan [1979].
40Suzuki [1999] provides additional citations along with an application to Japanese data.
41The pattern is difficult to explain, however, using a model that explains the structure of jurisdictions by
claiming that the benefit of larger jurisdictions is the internalization of externalities. As with other goods,
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to hold for the post-merger municipalities.
For tax base, we use the koku ratings reported in the GKCR. This is historical land tax
data, and, although denominated in rice, covers all sorts of production. As discussed in
Appendix C, land tax was the most important source of revenue during this period, and
thus use of the koku ratings seems appropriate. Figure 22 shows per capita koku ratings for
the feudal villages in the sample: the modal rating is close to 1 koku. This is a plausible
value: a koku was originally defined as the amount of rice required to feed a man for one
year, and production in rural Japan during this period was close to subsistence levels. Gifu,
like most of Japan, was predominantly rural and agricultural.
The boundaries shown in Figure 1 describe each feudal village as a polygon. However,
in most cases, the villages in the GKCR correspond to one or more clusters of houses,
surrounded by the land worked by these households. Although a household level map is
not available for Gifu, the Jinsoku Chizu of 1880 shows the precise location of households
for part of eastern Japan. Figure 10 in the Appendix shows a representative rural area:
the households are clearly clustered, and the location of households could be reasonably
accurately described using only a small number of points. We take advantage of this feature
of the population distribution of this period, and create a new dataset based on points rather
than polygons.
To do this, we use geocoded gazetteer data on Meiji locations, courtesy of the Center for
Integrated Area Studies at Kyoto University. This data is based on the 1891 and subsequent
maps of Gifu Prefecture. The relevant subset of this data is shown in Figure 11: the gazetteer
classifies points into types, and the most important for our purposes are “place” points.
About half of the feudal village polygons have exactly one “place” within their boundaries.
For these villages, we use this point as their geographic location. If a feudal village has more
than one “place”, then we keep track of all of these points, and will use them all (with equal
weighting) for distance calculations. Treatment of other cases is described in Appendix A.1.
Figure 12 shows the points that are used.
externalities would generally be considered to have decreasing marginal benefit (or increasing marginal
damage). Externalities that are generally plausible, such as pollution, traffic, or the exhaustion of common
pool resources, should generally be observed at higher levels in areas with higher population density. Thus,
the benefit of internalization should be higher, and larger jurisdictions should be observed in these areas. In
areas with low population density, the damage from the externalities is limited, and so there is no need for
large jurisdictions. Thus, the observed pattern of jurisdictions is opposite of that which would be expected in
the case where jurisdiction structure was determined by externalities. Japan was overwhelmingly rural during
this period: while population density varies substantially depending on terrain, there are only two locations
in Gifu that could reasonably be considered to be cities, consisting of less than 10% of the population.
The lack of large urban agglomerations also reduces the number of potential externalities that need to be
considered. In rural areas, the only plausible spillovers between municipalities are related to public works:
irrigation that uses scarce water, levees to protect against flooding, or roads. Below (unfinished), we consider
each of these, and argue that they do not offer a plausible explanation for the observed pattern of mergers.
18
For reporting simulation results graphically, we will display each feudal village as a single
point, with a location equal to the mean latitude and longitude for the points associated
with that feudal village. These “display points” are shown in Figure 13. This is purely
for ease of presentation, however, and all calculations described subsequently are done over
multiple points for the feudal villages that have them. In order to speed computation of
core partitions, we sometimes collapse the smallest feudal villages into other nearby villages
that ended up in the same merger. Thus, instead of 1099 players, computations are actually
performed using 910 players.42
42It is unclear why this 20% decrease in the number of players results in a dramatic speedup in computation
times. One potential explanation is that the presence of particularly small players prevents certain otherwise
useful heuristics from being applied successfully in the mixed integer program.
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Table 1: Summary of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Units Description Data Sources Used
FIXED.COST ¥ Fixed cost of providing public services Niigata-ken Shichouson Gappei Shi
DIST.WALKING 1000 sec. Distance in terms of walking time Center for Integrated Area Studies, Kyoto Univ. (points)
Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (elevation)
DIST.STRAIGHT km Straight line distance Center for Integrated Area Studies, Kyoto Univ. (points)
RELIGION Herfindahl Differences in religious sect identities GKCR
PRODUCTION Herfindahl Differences in (agricultural) products GKCR
PROPERTY Herfindahl Differences in types of property GKCR
LORD Herfindahl Differences in identity of manorial lord GKCR
during period before Meiji Restoration
FISH 100*Herfindahl Differences in fishing activity GKCR
WEALTH Herfindahl Differences in land holding distribution GKCR
HH300 Indicator Are there more than 300 households? GKCR
HH500 Indicator Are there fewer than 500 households? GKCR
For distance ℓ, we begin by calculating a straight-line distance and a walking distance,
based on the point data just discussed. Details regarding these calculations are provided in
Appendix A.2. We also calculate distances for other sorts of heterogeneity: Table 1 gives
the complete list of covariates used. Details regarding these covariates and their calculation
are given in Appendix A.3.
With the model described in Section 1 and the estimation strategy described in 2, the
fixed cost γ1 is identified only relative to the distance cost β. The variable cost γ2 is not
identified at all using the data regarding the partition chosen by the central planner, as for
any value of γ2 the rankings of partitions in terms of social welfare are the same. The choice
of a value for γ2 thus requires some sort of auxiliary data. This data can also be used to
provide units for interpreting coefficient estimates that would otherwise only have relative
interpretations.
Table 2: Cost of providing local government services
population cost















Source: government document reproduced in Niigata-ken Shichouson Gappei Shi.
During the merger period, government bureaucrats produced a document describing the
cost of providing public services for municipalities of three sizes: these costs are shown in
Table 2.43 Here c1 = ¥545.668 was a constant that corresponded to administrative costs
that exhibited efficiencies of scale, and c2 = ¥1467.931 was a constant corresponding to costs
that did not exhibit efficiencies of scale. At the three points provided, the costs correspond
exactly to a cost function of the form in Equation 1, with a fixed cost γ1 = c1/3, and a
variable cost γ2 = 2c1/3+c23165 , despite the fact that statistically there is an extra degree of
freedom. There is no explanation offered of how the government arrived at these estimates,
and thus it is unclear whether they believed that a cost function with only a fixed cost and a
variable cost was particularly appropriate, or whether at the sizes that they chose to examine
the efficiencies of scale happened to fit this pattern.
43A population of 3165 appears to have been used as the base because it corresponded to the average
population served by an administrative office under the briefly-used “ward” system, described in Appendix
C.1.
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Data points indicate actual spending by precursors to final municipalities: this data is from
1881, when the final municipal system was still under development. OLS is bivariate, pre-
dicting total spending based on population and intercept (the line is curved as a result of
transformation to log scale). The Meiji “govt” line is based on the fixed cost plus variable
cost associated with the three data points discussed in the main text, with an adjustment
to take into account that some services were paid not paid for by municipalities when the
1881 data was collected, and some revenue and associated expenses appears not to have been
included. The Showa “govt” line is exactly the functional form provided in 1950 government
documents describing the efficiencies of scale in the provision of local public goods, but has
been normalized such that it is equal to “govt (meiji)” at a population of 3165 (the reference
population for the Meiji government document).
22
There is no documentation available describing how these numbers were arrived at, but
some verification of other sorts is available. Data on actual municipal expenditures is avail-
able for 1881, before the implementation of the new municipal system. This is shown in
Figure 4, along with the government cost functions. Reiter and Weichenrieder [1997] survey
the existing literature and conclude that there has been limited success in using actual expen-
diture data to estimate efficiencies of scale. For comparison purposes, however, a bivariate
regression is provided in the figure. Finally, in 1950, when roughly the same municipal
structure was still in place, a government document describing the efficiencies of scale in the
provision of public services was produced. This document provides a detailed breakdown of
efficiencies of scale by service, for 20 public services, with the cost of each service described
by a spline function with 6 knots. Despite the gap of 60 years and a substantial expansion
in the number of public services provided, the estimates match the 1890 figures very closely,
as shown in Figure 4.44 We thus use values of γ1 and γ2 corresponding to Table 2.
Using the values of p, y, ℓ, and γ just discussed, we create X̃ matrices with which to
use the estimators discussed in Section 2. We create three such data matrices, in order to
ensure that estimates do not vary wildly depending on the precise partitions considered. The
alternative partitions that are used as comparison partitions are described in the following
section. Details regarding how each row of X̃ is constructed given an alternative partition
π′ are provided in B. Summary statistics regarding the data matrices are provided in Table
3.
4 Results
Table 4 gives results from the “probit” model of Equation 18, based on Assumption 1.
Estimates are shown for a variety of different sets Π′ of alternative partitions. The fixed cost
γ1 is not identified if all the alternative partitions have the same number of (post-merger)
municipalities as the actually observed partition π0: this is because regardless of the partition
chosen, there will be γ1|π′| = γ1|π0| paid in fixed cost, as all partitions considered have the
same number of municipalities. We first consider a set of alternative partitions that has this
characteristic, in order to be able to ignore the cost of providing services, and instead focus
purely on the tradeoffs the central planner appears to have made between different sorts
44An additional difference is that the 1890 figures appear to have been produced to describe the appropriate
size for municipalities during the reorganization, while the 1950 figures were for use in an equalization transfer
program. The different purpose suggest that any political biases in the reported figures would also be quite
different.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics (X̃)
I II III
“Switches” “Mergers/Splits” Both
FIXED.COST 0 -0.05 -0.02
(0) (0.13) (0.09)
DIST.WALKING 1.92 0.49 1.30
(2.84) (1.94) (2.59)
DIST.STRAIGHT 1.97 0.47 1.33
(2.99) (2.06) (2.73)
RELIGION 0.02 -0.03 0.002
(0.17) (0.13) (0.15)
PRODUCTION 0.05 0.01 0.03
(0.36) (0.13) (0.29)
PROPERTY 0.02 0.0004 0.01
(0.11) (0.05) (0.09)
LORD 0.28 0.05 0.18
(0.74) (0.35) (0.61)
FISH 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.49) (0.26) (0.41)






N 2257 1733 3990
Data described is X̃. As described in Equation 16, this is the difference between the char-
acteristics of the partition actually observed, and an alternative partition. The underlying
characteristics used to calculated these differences are described in Appendix FIXME.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates (Probit)
I II III IV V VI
FIXED.COST 0.99∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03)
DIST.WALKING −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.01) (0.003) (0.002)
DIST.STRAIGHT −0.04∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.002) (0.01)
RELIGION −0.04 −0.03 −0.05 −0.04 0.03 −0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
PRODUCTION −0.02 −0.02∗ −0.02∗ −0.02 −0.11∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
PROPERTY −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.02 −0.10∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
LORD −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)
FISH −0.13∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.10∗ −0.13∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
WEALTH −0.17 −0.16 −0.17∗ −0.17 −0.32∗ −0.21∗∗





Num. obs. 2257 2248 2257 2257 1733 3990
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Note: variance of error term is set to σ2 = 10, which makes FIXED.COST coefficient close to
1. Tradeoffs in table are thus (close to) interpretable in terms of yen.
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of heterogeneity. Columns I-IV of Table 4 show results using Π′1, a set of 2257 alternative
partitions created by moving player i from municipality m1 to m2, such that alternative
partition π′ contains m′1 = m1 \ i and m′2 = m2 ∪ i, instead of m1 and m2.45
Column I provides estimates of the tradeoff between seven types of heterogeneity: geo-
graphic distance, as expressed in minutes of walking time, and six other variables. Comparing
the coefficient estimates in Column I with the standard deviations in Table 3, we see that
geographic distance appears to be the most important determinant of the boundaries of po-
litical jurisdictions: the standardized coefficient is four times higher than that of any of the
other variables.
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We might wonder whether there is any evidence that the central planner actually chose
boundaries following the sort of model outlined in Section 1. One alternative hypothesis
is that the planner simply followed the instructions in Interior Ministry Order 352 exactly.
These instructions stated that municipalities should have between 300 and 500 households. In
Column II, we include two additional variables to take into account these instructions.46 The
first variable is statistically significant, but the second is not, and inclusion of these variables
does not have a substantial effect on the other coefficient estimates. It thus appears that the
45This is done for all i, m1, and m2, such that m1 contains at least two players, and i is geographically
adjacent to m2. This produces a total of 2257 moves.
46The construction of these variables is given in Appendix A.3.
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central planner may have been paying attention to the lower limit of 300 households, but
was also clearly considering other factors when deciding the pattern of mergers.47 The raw
data shows that the upper limit appears to have been less respected than the lower: Figure
5 shows that a substantial number of mergers resulted in municipalities of more than 500
households.
We also might wonder whether there is any evidence in the data that the central planner
actually considered walking distances, rather than simply looking at straight line distance, as
the latter is easier seen on a map. Column III repeats Column I, except substituting straight
line distance for walking distance. There is no substantial change in coefficients, other than
the coefficient on distance being somewhat lower. This is not particularly surprising, because
straight line distance and walking distance are highly correlated. Column IV includes both
distances. Here we see that the coefficient on walking distance has the expected sign and
if anything a slightly higher magnitude than Column I, whereas the coefficient on straight
line distance is statistically insignificant and has the opposite sign. We thus conclude that
the planner seems to have followed the Ministry instructions to consider the convenience of
transportation, and did not take the dramatic shortcut assuming that Gifu was flat, and
that all points that appeared to be equidistant on a map were in fact equally easy to reach.
Column V considers a different data set, using alternative partitions Π′2. This is a set
of 1733 alternative partitions created by considering a partition with one more merger, or
a partition where one of the actual mergers was split into two.With the alternatives in Π′2,
there are now a different number of municipalities in the alternative partition than in the
actual partition π0 (either one fewer or one more), and thus the fixed cost γ1 is now identified.
The units for fixed cost are yen, and for distance, 1000s of seconds. One hour of additional
walking time is thus equivalent to ¥0.219, or about the cost of a gallon of rice.The only
major difference in Column V is the coefficients on property and production, the former of
which is smaller and the latter larger, compared to Columns I-IV. The types of land present
in a municipality are closely related to the types of products produced, and the effect of
these two covariates may thus be difficult to separate.
Column VI reports results using a combined dataset, considering all the alternative parti-
tions Π′1∪Π′2. The results are broadly similar to those reported in the preceding columns.Due
to the assumptions required, the probit model reported in Table 4 is most useful for prelim-
inary analysis and quickly checking multiple specifications. We thus continue with models
based on more plausible assumptions.
For subsequent tables, we normalize so that fixed cost always has a coefficient of 1. As
fixed cost is denominated in yen, the coefficients can thus be read in terms of yen per unit
479 observations are missing in Column II because data on the number of households was not available.
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates (Smoothed Maximum Score)
I II III IV V VI VII
FIXED.COST 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
DIST.WALKING −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗













Num. obs. 3990 3990 3990 3990 3990 3990 3990
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
change in covariate. We use the same dataset as in Column VI of Table 4 for subsequent
tables, and all results are thus based on a comparison of the actually observed partition with
3990 alternative partitions.
Table 5 reports estimates from the “smoothed maximum score” estimator of Equation 22,
based on Assumption 2. Geographic distance has a slightly larger coefficient than in Table
4. Fewer variables are statistically significant in Column VII, although most are significant
if entered one at a time. The general conclusion is the same as Table 4: the coefficient on
geographic distance is much larger, relative to its standard deviation, than any of the other
variables.48
48In this and subsequent tables, the coefficient on fishing is much smaller than in Table 4. Most of the
villages in the dataset have few if any fishermen, while a few are very dependent on fish. This covariate
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates (Minimum Distance)
I II III IV V VI VII
FIXED.COST 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
DIST.WALKING −0.07∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗













Num. obs. 3990 3990 3990 3990 3990 3990 3990
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 6 reports estimates from the “minimum distance” estimator of Equation 24, based
on Assumption 3. Results here are broadly the same as in Tables 4 and 5, although statisti-
cal significance levels are lower. Unsurprisingly, statistical significance decreases as weaker
assumptions are employed in estimation. We do not report results for a column with all
variables included: all the coefficients except for distance become insignificant for most spec-
ifications beyond Column VII, and optimizing the objective function becomes increasingly
difficult.
Table 7 reports estimates from the “moment inequalities” estimator of Equation 25, based
on Assumption 4. With only distance included, the confidence set includes the coefficient
estimates in Tables 4 - 6. Including other variables, however, causes problems: confidence
sets for the distance coefficient become unbounded in two cases, and include zero in one
other case. If it is already known that Column I is an appropriate specification, then the
results in this table are useful. However, for exploratory analysis, Table 7 is basically useless:
Column V, for example, shows that differences in the lord that ruled the villages during the
feudal period is enough to satisfy all the moment inequalities generated from Equation 25,
without resorting to geographic distance at all. In the absence of good instruments for all
the covariates being considered, it is difficult to use moment inequalities to estimate more
complicated specifications than the single covariate in Column I. The results in Column I,
however, are useful, because they confirm that the estimates of the importance of walking
distance, relative to fixed cost, obtained in Tables 4 - 6, are plausible. Column I also suggests
that other reasonable values for the coefficient on distance would be ones that place relatively
more importance on distance: previous estimates are near the upper end of the confidence
set in Column I, and thus it might be useful to check values closer to the lower end as well.
To evaluate model fit, the optimal partition for the social planner can be calculated,
based on the parameter estimates. Appendix Figures 24 and 25 show these results.
more clearly violates the uniformity in Assumption 1.a than other covariates, which may explain why it is
the only one to have an order of magnitude difference in the estimates.
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Table 7: Parameter Estimates (Moment Inequalities)
I II III IV V VI VII
FIXED.COST 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DIST.WALKING [−0.12,−0.06]∗ [−∞,−0.03]∗ [−0.12,−0.06]∗ [−.12,−0.06]∗ [−.20, 0.04] [−0.12, 0.08] [−0.12,−0.04]∗













Num. obs. 3990 3990 3990 3990 3990 3990 3990
∗p < 0.05
5 Counterfactual Simulations
Suppose that, instead of centralized mergers, the individual feudal villages had been allowed
to decide independently how to arrange themselves into municipalities. With N players,
this leads to a potential 2N − 1 coalitions. With approximately 1000 players in the coalition
formation game, this is an unenumerably large number of coalitions.
For coalition m′ to be a blocking coalition for the partition π, it must be the case that
uim′ > uiπ for all i in m′. For a given π, we are interested in finding such an m′, or proving
that none exists and thus π is in the core. Rearranging Equation 2 and substituting it into























Let z be a vector of binary variables of length N , with zi = 1 if i ∈ m′, and zero otherwise.
In Inequality 27, the expression
∑
i′∈m′ yi′ can be rewritten as
∑
i′ zi′yi′ . The only variable in
Inequality 27 that is not known is z, and the inequality is linear in z. Consider the following
set of (pairs of) disjunctive constraints:
∀i either Inequality 27 holds or zi = 0. (28)
This is one pair of constraints per player, for a total of N pairs of constraints. The problem
of finding a coalition m′ that is a blocking coalition for the partition π can now be expressed
as finding z that satisfies (28). A problem in this form can be solved by commercial solvers.
Although in theory the problem has NP complexity, in practice, and with the actual data,
solutions can be obtained rapidly even with 1000 players. We use CPLEX, which considers
this problem to be a binary program with “indicator constraints”.49
Any given partition π may have many blocking coalitions. We thus configure the problem
as a maximization problem rather than a feasibility problem, by adding a slack variable t
and maximizing the slack:50
49Computational note: presolving the problem with 1000 players is computationally costly. Thus, we first
check sub-problems of county size. Only if none of these have a blocking coalition do we check the whole
1000 player problem. This reduces dramatically the amount of time spent in presolve.
50Fully solving this optimization problem dramatically lengthens the time required to find the next blocking

















Algorithm 1 attempts to find a core partition loosely following nomenclature and some
ideas regarding recursion from Ray and Vohra [1997]. In this algorithm, the binary program
to find a blocking coalition is used as part of the inner loop. The coalition formation game
considered in this paper contains “minimal inaccessible coalition configurations” as described
in Papai [2003], and thus the no-cycle results from the two-sided matching literature, such
as Roth and Vate [1990], do not apply. There is thus the possibility that Algorithm 1 will
loop forever.51 By using different weights on the slack variable in Inequality 29 for different
players, and randomizing this across runs, we pick out different paths of myopic deviations.
Data: N , y, p, ℓ, β
Result: A core partition π∗ (or loop forever)
Arbitrarily assign players to a starting partition π1;
Iteration count j = 1;
while there is a blocking coalition m′ for partition πj do
Identify “affected” coalitions, A = {m|m ∈ πj, ∃i ∈ m s.t. i ∈ m′};
Identify “residual” players, R = {i|i ∈ m ∈ A, i /∈ m′};
if R ̸= ∅ then
Recursion: find a core partition π∗R using only players R;
πj+1 = (πj \ A) ∪ {m′} ∪ π∗R;
else πj+1 = (πj \ A) ∪ {m′};
j = j + 1;
end
π∗ = πj;
Algorithm 1: Core Partition via Myopic Deviations
We run this algorithm based on parameters from Column I, Table 7.52 As only a set
estimate is provided, we consider three values of distance cost β: 0.06, 0.08, and 0.12. We
finding the first (integer feasible) solution results in different runs of the algorithm producing solutions. The
major advantage here is that for some values of the weights the algorithm terminates quickly, while for others
it does not terminate within the maximum allowable job time of the computer system used. Given that the
binary program is passed to a commercial solver it is difficult to investigate whether these runs are in a loop,
or would terminate at some higher run time.
51Drèze et al. [2008] consider a coalition formation game with transfers, and show theoretically that the
core is “almost” non-empty. This is matches with the empirical finding here that the core is non-empty in
the case without transfers.
52The justification for using this column comes from Tables 4 - 6.
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then run 100 counterfactual simulations using each of these values of β, and the algorithm
outlined above, with randomized weights drawn from a uniform distribution.53
These counterfactual simulations are performed using the observed data, from the GKCR
and other sources. However, according to the econometric model presented in Section 2, this
data is measured with error. Thus according to the model, the counterfactual simulations
are being performed on a counterfactual Gifu prefecture, that has characteristics that are
slightly noisier than the real Gifu prefecture.54
Computing the social planner’s optimal partition is also computationally challenging.
The optimization problem here is NP difficulty, and thus an approximation algorithm is
necessary.55 We base our approach on Yigit, Aydin, and Turkbey [2006], which uses sim-
ulated annealing as an inner optimization loop, and uses a genetic algorithm as an outer
optimization loop, for restarting the annealing algorithm at different starting points. The
overall approach is thus that of annealing with multiple restarts, using a particular method
of choosing the starting points. One advantage of this method is that the outer optimiza-
53An alternative method finding core partitions is by exhaustive enumeration. In this case, restrictions
need to be imposed so that the coalition formation game is computationally feasible. Specifically, consider
only coalitions that are geographically contiguous, and consist of 11 players or less. This covers the vast
majority of actual mergers. As an additional modification for computational simplicity, eliminate the smallest
players: iteratively merge those shizen son with very low population with the neighbouring shizen son that
has the closest koku rating per capita. This reduces the number of players to about 1080, instead of 1095,
but more importantly reduces the number of mergers with a large number of players, such that considering
mergers with up to 11 players covers virtually all of the potentially stable coalitions. Furthermore, rather
than considering the coalition formation game as a whole, with about a thousand players, break the game
into geographically contiguous units with about 40 players each. This corresponds to the standard IO setup
of considering geographic “markets” for goods. To ensure that these restrictions themselves do not bias
the results, the socially optimal partition will be computed using this same restricted set of coalitions. To
compute the core of each coalition formation game, the same approach based on random myopic deviations
will be used. As the number of potential partitions is finite, a properly randomized approach will eventually
find all partitions in the core. Ensuring reasonable performance is difficult, however, because of the possibility
of cycles of myopic deviations. A brute force approach to avoid cycles is thus used, following Algorithm 1,
but using exhaustive enumeration rather than mixed integer programming to find blocking coalitions. The
core of the decentralized coalition formation game that results is never empty, and while occasionally a
singleton, it generally consists of a small number of partitions, all corresponding to about the same level of
social welfare. The difference between the best and worst element of the core is minimal, corresponding to
less than the fixed cost of one additional municipality, in games where twenty municipalities are forming on
average.
54There is one case where the counterfactual simulation is correct, at least asymptotically: if the dis-
tribution of characteristics of players is a maximum entropy distribution, then adding measurement error
does not change this distribution. In this case, then, simulations based on the observed characteristics of
the players return (asymptotically) the same results as simulations based on the true characteristics of the
players. The most relevant maximum entropy distribution is the following: players are uniformly distributed
on the surface of a sphere. Here as the number of players becomes large, isotropic noise will not change the
distribution. The players in Gifu prefecture are somewhat close to uniformly distributed, and we ignore the
fact that they are distributed on only one small part of a sphere.
55Barros [1998] provides an introduction to these issues, based on some of the same techniques used in
this paper.
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Table 8: Simulation Results: Number of Municipalities
social equal actual no variable subsidized
planner tax base tax base cost fixed cost
0.0 1 1 60 1 99
0.06 224 268.2 409.9 255.8 724.8
(3.0) (2.7) (3.4) (1.0)
0.08 271 320.2 459.0 304.9 766.0
(2.7) (2.2) (3.3) (1.0)
0.12 341 396.0 540.6 382.8 831.2
(2.8) (1.9) (2.8) (0.9)
Estimated standard deviations of partitions within solution set are given in parentheses were
there are multiple solutions to the coalition formation game. The social planner’s optimal
partition is unique, as is the decentralized outcome where there is no distance cost.
tion loop is easily parallelizable. Figures 24 and 25 show the results of this optimization
approach.
Results for the counterfactual simulations are shown in Tables 8 (number of municipali-
ties) and 9 (inefficiency). The rows of these tables show different values of β used to perform
the simulations. For reference, we include as the first row the case where there is no het-
erogeneity cost (β = 0). This is a case discussed in Farrell and Scotchmer [1988]: from the
social planner’s perspective, the grand coalition is optimal, but differences in tax base will
lead to partitions with multiple coalitions in the decentralized case. For this row, we find
partitions based on the recursive algorithm provided by Farrell and Scotchmer [1988]. For
all other rows, we use Algorithm 1.
Column I in Table 8 shows the partition that would chosen by the social planner. By
definition, this partition is reported with an inefficiency of zero in Table 9. The remaining
columns describe various modifications made to the data used when performing simulations
of the decentralized coalition formation process.
Column II of Tables 8 and 9 shows the partitions that would arise if the per capita
tax base, y/p, were set to be the same for all players in the game.56 This is the case




i=1 pi. As discussed in Appendix
C, this is approximately 1, due to the units used (amount required to feed one man for a year) and the fact
35








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Edges indicate members of the same coalition. Colours are the same within each coalition,
but random across coalitions. No players are missing (“off the page”) on the left or right
sides of the figure.
36
Table 9: Simulation Results: Inefficiency (¥1000)
social equal actual no variable subsidized
planner tax base tax base cost fixed cost
0 0 0 10.9 0 18.0
0.06 0 2.4 14.6 1.5 60.7
(1.7) (1.6) (0.3) (1.4)
0.08 0 3.5 10.3 1.7 56.6
(1.6) (1.2) (0.2) (0.2)
0.12 0 3.3 22.6 1.7 52.9
(1.5) (0.8) (0.2) (0.1)
Estimated standard deviations of partitions within solution set are given in parentheses were
there are multiple solutions to the coalition formation game. The social planner’s optimal
partition is unique, as is the decentralized outcome where there is no distance cost.
where there is “horizontal” heterogeneity (geographic), but no “vertical” heterogeneity (tax
base per capita). We see that even in this case the partitions that arise as a result of the
decentralized coalition formation process are not exactly the same as the one that would
be chosen by the social planner. We also verify that the social planner’s partition is not
part of the core. However, the partitions that are formed only have slightly more mergers
than would have been selected by the social planner. Figure 6 shows one randomly selected
core partition from the β = 0.06 row of Column II.57 From a qualitative point of view, the
coalitions displayed in Figure 6 appear reasonable from the social planner’s perspective: most
coalitions form convex sets, and the cases where this is not true can usually be explained
by intervening mountains making the selected coalition structure more reasonable from the
perspective of walking distance.58
In contrast, Figure 7 shows a random example of the coalition structure that arises in
the decentralized coalition formation game in the case where the actual per capita tax base
data is used. Statistics for 100 such random partitions are shown in Column III of Tables 8
and 9. In the case where different players have different per capita tax bases, there are about
that Gifu was close to subsistence level during this period.
57The lowest distance cost row is used for visualization because the coalitions that result are larger, and
thus patterns are more readily apparent, and the comparison with the following figure more striking.
58The walking distance matrix is not isomorphic to a euclidean distance matrix, and thus it is not possible
to represent the walking distance for players in a figure such as Figure 6.
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Edges indicate members of the same coalition. Colours are the same within each coalition,
but random across coalitions. No players are missing (“off the page”) on the left or right
sides of the figure.
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70% more coalitions than in the partition selected by the social planner. Furthermore, the
coalitions that do form are not generally convex in a geographic sense, as those in 6 were. This
is because, as in Farrell and Scotchmer [1988], in the case where players differ in a vertical
characteristic (one where everyone wishes to merge with others that have more of it), players
wish to merge based on this vertical characteristic, and thus trade off heterogeneity in the
horizontal characteristic in exchange for this. In the model in Section 1, however, the same
amount in total is being spent on providing services for any configuration involving the same
number of coalitions. Thus, this willingness to accept coalition partners that are a worse
match on the horizontal characteristic, in exchange for being a better match on the vertical
characteristic, is inefficient from a social perspective, at least in the case of the quasilinear
utility used in the model in Section 1.
This result is due to the form of the cost of public goods for the data used: there is
both a fixed cost that generates efficiencies of scale, as well as a marginal cost that reflects
high congestibility. In this environment, adding an additional player who is substantially
poorer will increase the tax rate for members of a coalition, and thus a decentralized process
results in jurisdictions that are substantially smaller than the social optimum. Given the
heterogeneity in income observed in the data, and the apparent cost function for the pro-
vision of public goods, decentralization of jurisdiction formation would result in substantial
inefficiency. In contrast, in Column II there is no variation in income, and thus tax per
capita is equal to the variable cost plus the average fixed cost. In this scenario adding an
additional member to a coalition always decreased the tax rate.
An objection could be made that the mergers shown in Figure 7 are unreasonable, and
only serve to show that the model of Section 1 is an inappropriate model of municipal
mergers. In particular, although geographic adjacency is not shown in Figure 7, it is clear
that some of the mergers predicted are not geographically contiguous.59 Should any realistic
model of municipal mergers really be predicting these sorts of configurations?
Figure 8 shows a set of decentralized municipal mergers that actually occurred in Aomori
Prefecture around 2006. These mergers were part of the Heisei daigappei set of municipal
mergers. The figure shows three geographically discontiguous mergers, involving in total
eight geographically contiguous municipalities. In the centralized mergers of the Meiji period,
these sorts of arrangements are not observed in the data. Thus, bizarre configurations of the
sort shown in Figure 7 can and do occur in reality, and they do so only during decentralized
mergers (Heisei) and not centralized ones (Meiji). Furthermore, the qualitative explanation
59This can be verified by looking at Figure 13 in Appendix C, which shows the geographic adjacencies of
the players.
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Source: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan
Map colours indicate members of the same coalition. Japanese text gives the names of pre-
merger municipalities (in black) and post-merger municipalities (in colour). Arrows join
members of non-contiguous coalitions.
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offered for the outcome shown in Figure 8 is also in line with the model in Section 1: the
municipalities shown on the map differed substantially in levels of indebtedness and revenue
sources, and the observed mergers were the result of an attempt to avoid matching with
undesirable but neighbouring municipalities.
The comparison of Figure 7 and Figure 8 suggests that perhaps the model intended
for and the data from the Meiji period can be used to perform a more general analysis of
municipal mergers in Japan. Since the beginning of the modern municipal system (described
in Appendix C, there have been three waves of mergers: Meiji, Showa, and Heisei. The
Meiji mergers were centralized. The Heisei mergers were decentralized, with the national
government offering a specific set of financial incentives (including both a “carrot” and a
“stick”) in order to encourage municipalities to merge.60 The Showa mergers appear to
have characteristics of both centralized and decentralized mergers. There was substantial
involvement of higher levels of government, both national and prefectural. At the prefectural
level, committees drew up formal merger plans for the entire prefecture.61 On the other hand,
the final mergers had to be approved at the municipal level. One interpretation of this is
that the municipal approval was mere window dressing, and municipalities could not refuse
to participate in the national government plan. Our simulation results suggest another
potential explanation for the seemingly contradictory “centralized and decentralized” nature
of the Showa mergers.
As documented in Appendix C, during the Meiji period there were effectively no transfers
from the national government to municipalities, and only extremely limited assistance from
prefectures. This allows for the simple model developed in Section 1. After World War
II, however, the Shoup Report commissioned by occupation forces recommended revisions
to the municipal finance system. This resulted in the Heikou Koufukin (later renamed the
Chihou Koufuzei), a transfer system that would eventually grow to enormous size. Two
stylized facts regarding this transfer system are important: during the Showa period, it was
widely considered to provide inadequate equalization for capital costs, while in the Heisei
period capital costs were seen as overstated, and the system was seen instead as providing
inadequate equalization for larger cities.
A stylized version of the transfer system in place throughout the post-war period is that
60For a recent discussion of the Heisei mergers in the domestic literature, see Machida [2006]. The general
consensus appears to be that mergers occurred democratically, subject to the financial incentives. The “stick”
portion of the national government funding formula change in particular appears to have led many small
municipalities to participate in mergers. This qualitative discussion agrees with the theoretical results in
Weese [2015] regarding when the “stick” should be used.
61In the case of Aomori Prefecture, these plans were actually based on a formal matching model, complete
with a payoff structure and an approximation algorithm.
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it is based on lump-sum transfers.62 Previous analysis shows that these transfers can be
modelled as a fixed plus variable amount: this is directly related to the fact that the cost
of providing services can be modelled in this way. Thus, rewrite the budget constraint of
Equation 2 as







where T1 is the fixed transfer amount, and T2 the variable transfer amount, depending on the
amount of municipal services that need to be provided. In Equation 30, a transfer scheme
of this sort, from the perspective of the municipalities, is equivalent to a change in the fixed
and variable costs to
γ̃1 = γ1 − T1
γ̃2 = γ2 − T2 (31)
(32)
Thus, to simulate the results that would occur in a decentralized set of mergers with a certain
equalization transfer scheme, we need only to change the parameters γ1 and γ2 to γ̃1 and γ̃2
when running the decentralized simulations, but then retain the original γ1 when calculating
the optimal partition from the perspective of the social planner.63 We can thus ask what
the effect of an equalization system of various sorts might have been on municipal mergers,
by asking what the core of the decentralized coalition formation game would look like under
different parameters for the cost function.
Suppose that there were no variable cost: c(P ) = γ1 for all populations P . This is
a situation often considered in the theoretical literature, and corresponds very roughly to
the case of the equalization payments in the Showa period. Column IV of Table 8 shows
that in this case the decentralized partitions are very close to the partition that would
have been chosen by the social planner.64 The intuition for this result is that, with only
62The details of the system are quite complicated, and subsidies were also present. The appendix of Weese
[2015] provides a brief English-language description.
63For calculating the socially optimal partition, γ2 is irrelevant, as discussed above. It matters in the
decentralized case because higher variable costs will result in greater tax payments and thus more interest
in finding merger partners with substantial tax bases but few people to consume services.
64In this case, the core is much larger, often consisting of hundreds of possible partitions. The difference
among these partitions in welfare terms, however, is small, corresponding to the fixed cost of one or two
additional municipalities. When comparing the core to the partition that would have been selected by the
social planner, the situation is now very different than the case in which there was also a variable cost of
providing public services: the core now often includes the planner’s preferred partition, and when it does
not, the difference in welfare terms between the partitions in the core and the planner’s preferred partition
is very small, usually corresponding to less than the fixed cost of one additional municipality. Thus, while
theoretically there may be inefficiency due to decentralized mergers in this environment, from an empirical
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a fixed cost of providing services, adding any member to a coalition will decrease the tax
rate that needs to be charged. If there were no horizontal (geographic) differentiation, this
case would correspond exactly to that of Farrell and Scotchmer [1988], where there is no
inefficiency. The presence of geographic heterogeneity creates the potential for inefficiency,
but empirically this is not severe. Thus, in an environment in which public goods can be
provided with only a fixed cost, it appears that decentralized mergers are unlikely to cause
any particular problems.
This result provides a potential explanation for the contradictory nature of the Showa
mergers, which were apparently both centralized and decentralized at the same time.65 With
an equalization system of the sort in place during the Showa period, decentralized coalitions
were very similar to those that the social planner would have selected.66 Thus, during the
Showa period, there was close to no contradiction between the centrally planned merger
pattern, and one that municipalities would have wanted to carry out. One might imagine,
then, the central planner began by creating a partition. This was either then modified to
ensure that it corresponded to a core partition, or (more likely, given the anecdotal evidence)
the small number of reluctant municipalities were bludgeoned into accepting the proposed
partition, even though blocking coalitions existed. An explanation of this sort does not
appear anywhere in the literature, but instead arises from the simulations performed based
on the model in this paper.
Now, consider a transfer scheme of the sort in use in the Heisei period. As documented
by DeWit [2002] and others, the transfer system by this point had changed into one that
was exceedingly generous with respect to capital investments, which were large for smaller
municipalities, but did not really adequately compensate municipalities for the variable costs
incurred. The extreme case of such a transfer scheme would be one in which the fixed
cost is completely subsidized, in which case no players would be interested in any mergers
perspective this inefficiency, when present, is very small. Given that the core in theoretical models is often
quite large, it is not particularly surprising that the best partition in the core is either close to or the same
as the socially optimal partition. The more surprising aspect of the empirical result is that there are no
elements of the core that are particularly bad in welfare terms.
65Tanaka and Kadotami [1963] summarizes the view of the Showa mergers as centralized, citing Kawaguchi
[1960a], Kawaguchi [1960b], Kawaguchi [1961], Oshima [1958], Oshima [1959], and Fukutake [1959]. Steiner
[1965], however, gives a case study where local politics played a key role in the merger process. More recent
research includes Ichikawa [2011], who emphasizes the importance of both local governments and the national
government in the merger process, and Arakaki [2010], who argues that the large number of municipal splits
is evidence of central control.
66One might wonder, in fact, what the “best” partitions might look like in Column IV. The method of
random myopic deviations does not really provide any method to select particularly desirable partitions from
a social perspective (choosing the “best” myopic deviation is computationally costly, because the objective
becomes non-linear. Using the Dinkelbach [1967] approach is possible, but the increase in computation time
is not rewarded by partitions that are particularly good from the social planner’s perspective.
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in the decentralized case. In order to cause decentralized mergers to occur, the national
government offered a set of financial incentives, both rewarding those municipalities that
chose to participate in mergers, and penalizing those that did not. In an extremely rough
sense, these incentives correspond to municipalities becoming responsible for a portion of the
fixed cost. We calculate the fraction of the fixed cost, based on calculations in Weese [2015],
and determine that the incentive corresponds to roughly two thirds of the fixed cost. We
then consider a set of decentralized mergers, with the municipalities only considering this
fraction of the fixed cost.
Results are shown in Column V of Table 8. The number of coalitions is far higher than
in any of the other columns, and indeed reaches the resolution of the data, in the sense that
most municipalities remain as singletons, with only the smallest participating in mergers at
all.67 It thus appears that, in contrast to the equalization payments offered during the Showa
period, the type of subsidy provided during the Heisei period results in substantial problems
when considering decentralized mergers. The intuition for this is fairly straightforward: a
transfer payment scheme equivalent to part of the fixed cost γ1 reduces the incentive to merge
from the perspective of the municipality. In contrast, a transfer payment scheme equivalent
to part of the variable cost γ2 reduces the importance of the differences in per capita tax
base. Thus, the former case results in municipalities choosing a decentralized merger pattern
that is even less desirable, from the perspective of the social planner, while the latter case
results in mergers that are quite close to the social optimal.68
A separate question is what results would occur if there were vertical (income) hetero-
geneity, but no horizontal (geographic) heterogeneity. This case corresponds exactly to the
model in Farrell and Scotchmer [1988]. Here the socially optimal result is for the grand
coalition to form, but the presence of the variable cost means that players will minimize
their tax rate by avoiding forming coalitions with poorer players. Empirical estimates here
67One might wonder whether this means that the actual inefficiency would be even higher, if only the size
of the players were smaller, and thus it were possible for an even finer partition to emerge. It turns out that
this appears to not be the case. Suppose that we wished to approximate the same configuration, except with
smaller players. One way to do this, albeit in only an approximate sense, would be to start by halving the
distance cost (say, β = 0.03 instead of β = 0.06), which is equivalent to halving all the distances. Then,
in order to return population density to its original value, reduce all the populations (and koku ratings) of
municipalities by (1/2)2 = 1/4. This produces a “zoomed in” version of the original configuration, which, if
the number of players is large, and their distribution fractal (so that the zoomed in configuration has the same
distribution as the original configuration), then the resulting number of coalitions in core partitions should be
the same, except in the case where the core partitions in the initial case were anomalously large because the
initial player sizes were too big. We find that this effect is, in fact, not particularly important: the “zoomed
in” core partitions have 210% more coalitions, compared to the initial case with 180% more coalitions. Thus,
it appears that with the initial data we are calculating roughly the right amount of inefficiency.
68In the official government evaluation of the Heisei mergers (“Heisei no Gappei” no Hyouka-Kenshou-
Bunseki), the reluctance of municipalities to merge is noted. In contrast, in the Showa mergers, the number
of municipalities was reduced by 6152, very close to the targeted reduction of 6273 [Yoshitomi, 1960].
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give a total of about 60 coalitions forming. Thus, in one sense the inefficiency resulting
from vertical heterogeneity only is dramatically larger than that resulting from horizontal
heterogeneity only. However, given the cost function, if the number of players is increased,
with the new players having per capita incomes drawn from the same income distribution,
the number of municipalities will increase at a slower rate than the number of players. Thus,
asymptotically, the per capita inefficiency will fall to zero as the number of players becomes
large. In contrast, suppose that the asymptotics considered for the case of horizontal het-
erogeneity are that additional players are always added on the “edge”, and the game thus
expands across the plane while maintaining a constant density of players. In this case the
level of inefficiency will not decrease as more players are added. Thus, with this asymptotic
interpretation, the inefficiency resulting from only vertical heterogeneity eventually disap-
pears, while the inefficiency resulting from only horizontal heterogeneity is low but constant
in the number of players.
In order to obtain substantial amounts of inefficiency empirically, then, both horizon-
tal and vertical heterogeneity are required. In addition, the cost function must include a
component that looks like a fixed cost (to provide a incentive to form coalitions), and a
component that looks like a variable cost (to provide an incentive to keep relatively poorer
players out of the coalition). This situation corresponds to the situation that appears to
actually be the case empirically, and thus it appears that decentralized mergers, had they
been implemented, would have resulted in substantial amounts of inefficiency. However, as
theoretical models with both vertical and horizontal heterogeneity appear to be very diffi-
cult to solve, the empirical results suggest that it may be difficult to capture the empirically
relevant sources of inefficiency in a tractable theoretical framework.
A quantitative interpretation of the amount of inefficiency displayed in Table 9 is chal-
lenging, because local government during the Meiji period began as a very small portion of
GDP but then grew quickly as Japan industrialized. Table 10 in the Appendix suggests that
the units used in Table 9 correspond roughly to the annual salary of a senior government
official. The total expenditures on police by Gifu prefecture Table 14 in the Appendix is
roughly equal to the inefficiency reported in Column V of Table 9. Thus, the calculated
amounts of inefficiency are important when considered in the context of the size of Meiji-era
local governments, even though they are not large in absolute terms.
An alternative interpretation could be obtained by scaling up the inefficiency reported
in Table 9 by the difference in expenditures on public services between the Meiji period
and the present. The fixed costs γ1 represent 12% of the estimated expenditures on public
services in Gifu, and the inefficiency reported in Column V of Table 9 is equivalent to about
a doubling of this component, or a little more than 10% of local government spending. Local
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government spending as a percentage of GDP is difficult to calculate, due to the extremely
large transfer system but if it were in the range of 15-25%, then inefficiency would represent
2-3% of GDP. Thus, the amount of inefficiency calculated may be large, but this depends on
the method used to compare it to total output.
6 Conclusion
Based on a simple model of local public good provision, a moment inequalities based approach
was used to estimate parameters describing individual utility as a function of the pattern of
political jurisdiction boundaries. Simulation results show that in the case with both vertical
and horizontal heterogeneity, decentralized jurisdiction formation results in substantial in-
efficiency, but this is not the case in the situation with only horizontal heterogeneity. This
suggests that allowing political sub-units to exercise a “right to self-determination” may re-
sult in jurisdictions that are close to the optimal partition if there is little heterogeneity in
income, but could result in substantial inefficiency as income heterogeneity increases. The
presence of an fiscal transfer system can either improve or worsen the inefficiency, depending
on the precise form of the transfers.
Extending the results obtained above to the case of national boundaries is challenging,
because the degree of inefficiency depends on the cost function for providing national public
goods, for which no good estimates appear to be available. Thus it appears to be difficult
to draw firm conclusions about the severity of the potential problem at the international
level.69 If the cost function for national public goods is similar to the cost function for local
public goods, though, the inefficiency may be economically significant.
69Some interesting relative conclusions can be drawn from the results in this paper. For example, given
the importance of differences in per capita tax base to the inefficiency results, the case of Crimea (poorer
than the rest of the Ukraine) choosing to join Russia may actually be less worrisome than, for example,
relatively richer areas (such as Catalonia) seeking to leave relatively poorer areas (such as the rest of Spain).
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A Data Construction
This appendix describes the exact method used to construct each of the variables listed in
Table 3.
A.1 Points
If a village has no “place” points within its boundaries, then we use the location of a train
station, in the very small number of cases that one exists.70 If a village still has no points,
we continue with gazetteer points related to municipality names, which are less attractive
because the geocoding for these do not appear to be as accurate as for the “place” points.
We continue in the same fashion for schools, companies, structures, and plains.71 There are
59 feudal villages for which no points are found via this method. After manual inspection, 29
of these are cases where an appropriately named point is located just outside of the village
polygon. In the remaining 30 cases, we use the geographic centroid of the polygon for the
location. Figure 9 shows a histogram of the number of points per feudal village. For a
majority of feudal villages, we have exactly one point associated with the village, although
in a small number of cases there are a dozen or more points associated with a single feudal
village.
70These are less desirable, because were generally built after the municipal merger period, and only show
up in the gazetteer because some of the maps on which it is based come from the early 20th century. There
are only 9 train stations in the gazetteer.
71In all cases, the first item shown in the “order of use” legend in Figure 11 to have any points inside the
feudal village boundaries is used as the location of that village. If this item has multiple points within the
feudal village boundaries, then we keep track of all of these.
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Figure 9: Points per Feudal Village
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Figure 10: Toyota County, Ibaraki Prefecture
Figure 11: Gazetteer Point Data
Figure 12: Points Used from Gazetteer
A.2 Distance
The straight-line distance is calculated using the great-circle distance formula, assuming that
the earth is a sphere. For feudal villages represented by more than one point, this distance
is calculated as the average distance across all relevant points. That is, if Ji is the set of
points associated with feudal village i, and Ji′ the set of points associated with feudal village









where, with some abuse of notation, ℓD.Sjj′ is the straight line distance between point j and
point j′. The result of repeated application of Equation 33 is a distance matrix ℓD.S containing
a straight line distance ℓii′ for each pair of feudal villages i and i′. To create X·D.S, we then
use Equation 11, with distances ℓii′ taken from the matrix ℓD.S.
For expositional purposes, we calculate a histogram of the straight line distances between
adjacent feudal villages: these are ℓD.Sii′ , with the (i, i′) pairs used corresponding to the edges
shown in Figure 13. Figure 14 reports these distances, with the modal distance being a bit
less than 2km, and some distances being substantially longer.
Straight line distance is likely inappropriate in the case of Gifu, however, because much of
the prefecture is mountainous, and thus the actual path used to travel between two villages
would not be a straight line, but rather a more complicated route that minimizes elevation
changes. For these calculations, we do not consider data on the road network in place during
this period: this network was relatively primitive, and we assume that there are walking
tracks located wherever our algorithm calculates that people will be travelling. Although
trains were being introduced during this period, they were used for longer distance journeys,
and are not relevant for distance calculations between a feudal village and its neighbour, or
the next village over. Thus, we consider walking as the only mode of transport.
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Each vertex is a player, and edges indicate geographic adjacency. Adjacency information
is used to calculate the set of alternative partitions for estimation, but is not used for
counterfactual simulations (i.e. the set of potential partitions is not restricted to consist
only of contiguous mergers).
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Figure 14: Straight-line Distance
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Figure 15: Elevation
Dark brown indicates low elevation, white higher elevations, and green highest. In mountainous regions, low elevations tend to correspond to river valleys.
Given the mountainous nature of the prefecture, we assume that the major determinant
of walking time is elevation change.72 We use digital elevation data from the Geospatial
Information Authority of Japan, at 10 meter grid square resolution. Figure 15 shows this
elevation data.
Figure 16: Walking Distance
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To calculate walking time between two points based on this elevation data, we use the
Fontanari [2000] implementation of Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm, applied to a raster
version of the elevation data.73 The walking time returned is anisotropic: the cost of walking
uphill is not simply equal to the benefit of walking downhill. Thus, the shortest path to a
destination may be different from the shortest path returning from it. We use the roundtrip
distance, following both of these paths, divided by two.74 In the case where feudal villages
are associated with multiple points, the approach in Equation 33 is used. Figure 16 reports
the walking distances for adjacent feudal villages. The units used here are 1000s of seconds,
72Rivers in Gifu are often seasonal, and generally small. A qualitative inspection of boundaries shows that
they do not appear to follow rivers in a systematic way, and a preliminary quantitative analysis using GMM
and the actual location of the boundary between two adjacent municipalities appeared to confirm this. We
do not report these results because the standard errors were very high, and the econometric model used
differs substantially from that presented in Section 2.
73This is the “walking distance” function r.walk in the GRASS GIS package. Parameters are left at their
default values, which correspond to the Aitken [1977] and Langmuir [1984] adjustments to the Naismith
[1892] walking time function.
74One is reminded of hiking trails that split at certain points, offering both steeper and gentler route.
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because walking speed is approximately 1km per 1000sec, and thus with these units coefficient
estimates will be of roughly comparable magnitudes when using the straight line distance
data and the walking distance data. According to the figure, the modal walking time to an
adjacent village is a bit less than two hours.
Figure 17: Most important product (by value)
Production information on quantities from the GKCR is multiplied by price.
Figure 18: Most important land type (by value)
Land value information from GKCR
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Figure 19: Most important feudal lord
Figure 20: Religious sects
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Landlords in each village are counted by size of landholdings: greater than ¥100, 200, 300,
500, 700, 1000, 1500, 2000, 5000, 10000, and 20000. Violet corresponds to small landlords,
and red to large landlords. Villages are sorted by amount of total holdings. Because of data
quality issues, no “less than ¥100” category is used.















Figure 17 shows the most important product in each feudal village by value, with the legend
including data on the total share of each item. To calculate a distance with this data, we
use discrete version of Equation 33. Instead of points located geographically, let j now index
types of products, and let J be the set of all products.75 The distance between feudal villages







where sprodij is the share of the j product in feudal village i’s production.











where prodi is total production in feudal village i, and prodm is total production in coalition
m.
with distances ℓii′ taken from the matrix ℓD.S.
In addition to agriculture, some areas of Gifu engaged in fishing. This was mainly along
the banks of rivers, although some ponds and lakes appear to also have been used. Figure
23 shows the distribution of fishermen in Gifu.
75|J|=37 in the GKCR data, but even approximate price data only appears to be available for 21 of these,




The official orders that resulted in the Meiji municipal mergers occurring explicitly men-
tioned a target size for amalgamated municipalities: they were supposed to be between 300




1(HHm > 300)Xπ,HH500 =
∑
m∈π
1(HHm < 500). (36)
This only makes sense if all the partitions considered contain the same number of munici-
palities. This will in fact be the case for the analysis that uses this variable.76
B Construction of X
The alternative partitions considered consist either of moving a single municipality from
one merger to another (Π′1), or performing one additional merger or one fewer merger than
actually occurred (Π′2). The precise construction of X̃ is strongly influence by a desire to keep
all entries of this data matrix at roughly the same order of magnitude, as this substantially
reduces computational difficulties.
Consider first Π′1, where a single feudal village i is reassigned. Treat the other portion
of municipality m1 as a single player, labelled m′1 below. The difference in the heterogeneity
76It might be possible to rewrite the equations so that they are an average rather than a sum. We do not
pursue this, and it is not obvious that it would lead to reasonable results.
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where L is defined as in 4, except weighted by the relevant variable z rather than y. Suppose
that the measurement error in the L(m′1,m′1) and L(m2,m2) terms is zero. Then there are
four terms with measurement error, all related to moving player i.
Now consider the case of a merger. Here the heterogeneity cost will be
zm1(L(m1,m1 ∪m2)− L(m1,m1)) + zm2(L(m2,m1 ∪m2)− L(m2,m2)) (38)
Here similarly suppose that the measurement error in the L(m1,m1) and L(m2,m2) terms
is zero. Then there are two terms with measurement error, both related to the m1 ∪ m2
merger.
Suppose that we wish to make each term equally important, regardless of whether z is
particularly high or low in this particular case. Then we should divide by the value of z.
This is useful empirically, even though it is not exactly the model laid out in Section 1. It
remains to choose what value of z to divide by: we choose 4zi in the case of swaps, and
2 z1+z2
2
in the case of mergers.77
C Meiji Data
This appendix describes the administrative system in place for the Meiji municipal mergers.
This was a period of rapid administrative change, and while we focus our attention on the
situation in 1890 (Meiji 23), when the mergers in Gifu prefecture were largely finalized, we
will also describe the system in the years leading up to this, as this is when many initial
mergers occurred. We will focus in particular on two aspects. First, we will describe the
system of taxation, and the degree to which it can be represented by a model with a single
proportional tax rate. Second, we will describe the type of fiscal federalism in place, and the
lack of large scale equalization payments.
77Algebra based on i.i.d. measurement errors would suggest dividing by
√
2 instead of 2. The implications
of such an approach are undesirable, however: carried out fully, enormous weight would be placed on
observations involving large coalitions, because the i.i.d. assumption implies that the aggregate measurement
error is smaller for these coalitions, compared to the true changes. A plausible model of error structures
that does not display this phenomenon appears challenging to develop, and we thus use an ad hoc approach
instead.
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Figure 24: Predicted mergers vs. actual mergers
The dots indicate the centroids of the mergers the social planner is predicted to select, given
the estimated parameters. The lines indicate the boundaries of the mergers that were actually
observed. A good fit of the model with the observed data is indicated by one centroid per
observed merger. Areas where there are multiple centroids per observed merger, or fewer
centroids than observed merger, are areas where the model fit is not as good.
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Figure 25: Predicted boundaries
Voronoi cells calculated based on the centroids of the optimal partition, based on parameter
estimates. If a new player with very small population were added to the data, the cells
indicate which municipality the social planner would assign the new player to. The model
predicts substantial variation in the size of municipality between the densely populated plain
in the middle of the prefecture, and the more mountainous areas at the edges.
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Almost all municipal spending was devoted to three items: education, public works, and
general administration. Education spending was almost entirely devoted to primary school-
ing, generally using a single school. Public works spending consisted mainly of spending on
roads, irrigation, and flood prevention. Administration consisted mainly of maintaining the
population register, collecting taxes, and some shared organizational overhead for the other
expenditures. The major source of tax revenue was property tax, which was proportional
to land holdings.78 Decision-making was democratic, but with a restricted franchise, and a
multi-tier voting system that gave extra weight to the elite.
The modern Japanese system for local government, both from an administrative and fiscal
perspective, was established by a combination of the 1888 municipal administrative laws, the
1890 county and prefectural administrative laws, and the 1889 imperial constitution.79 Fujita
[1955], as well as most other historians of Japanese local government, regard this as period in
which there was strong central control over local affairs. With some exceptions, this control
tended to be exercised in a way that was technocratic rather than partisan.
The municipal merger process in Gifu prefecture differed in some details from that in
other prefectures. In many prefectures, the Meiji daigappei municipal mergers coincided
closely with the passage of the 1888 municipal laws, with the aim of completing the mergers
at the time the laws came into force.
Ido [1966] provides a summary of this merger process. The mergers resulted in an average
of 5.15 old municipalities being amalgamated into one new one.80 However, in Yamanashi,
Gifu, Nagasaki, and Nagano prefectures, the average number of old municipalities amal-
gamated into a new one was much lower: 1.39, 1.44, 1.77, and 2.27, respectively. This is
because these four prefectures had already undertaken a set of municipal mergers around
1874-76, under the older “ward” ordinance (daiku shouku sei) of 1871.
Thus, in these prefectures, only a smaller number of mergers were necessary around 1888
in order to establish a system of local government consistent with the new laws.81 Because
78The other major source of tax revenue was a household tax that was related to income, but was not
strictly proportional. There appears to be debate in the literature regarding the exact nature of this tax
Takayose [2000]. The assumption used in this paper is that taxation is overall proportional, and thus that
the non-proportionality in the household tax is due to the fact that poorer households derive less of their
income from property, and thus are taxed more heavily on the household tax.
79These laws were the (shi-sei and chouson-sei, covering cities and towns/villages, respectively, as well as
the gun-sei for counties and fuken-sei for prefectures. A variety of other related laws were also put in place
during this period. An authoritative reference here is Oishi [1961].
80According to Ido [1966], at the end of 1888 there were 71,314 municipalities, 2482 of which were in
special areas covered by a different set of laws, and 68,832 of which were covered by the standard set of laws.
At the end of 1889, mergers within the latter group had reduced its number to 13,377. This was reported
as a ratio of 5.14.
81In Gifu, in between the 1874-76 mergers and the 1888 mergers, there was a period with 19 splits but
no mergers (History of Gifu Prefecture, p. 231). A more detailed model might thus account for the fact
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of the lengthier merger process in Gifu, a description of how the mergers in the prefecture
were actually implemented requires a discussion of the entire 1871-1888 period. For this
discussion, it is useful to follow the subdivisions in Yokoyama [1957], looking first at the
period before the local government organization law of 1878 (Gun kuchouson hensei hou),
and then the period after it.
C.1 Meiji Local Public Finance, 1871-1878
After the Meiji restoration of 1868, important early objectives of the new regime included
the abolition of the feudal system and the establishment of a modern administrative infras-
tructure. The former objective was accomplished with the mass seizure of feudal domains
in 1869 (the hanseki houkan), and the latter began in 1871 with the haihan chiken, which
replaced these 300+ feudal administrative divisions with a system of prefectures, governed
by prefects.82 Although central control was prioritized, these prefectures were given a certain
degree of decision-making authority in order to be able to quickly respond to local conditions.
Within each prefecture, the prefect and other important positions were centrally appointed,
but there were also provisions for consultative bodies, including elected ones.83
The modern resident registration system was established as these reforms were ongoing.
Under the 1871 koseki law, the residence of each individual was tracked by administrators
at the local level. The regions covered by these administrators formed the wards and sub-
wards of the “ward” ordinance of 1871.84 Each ward was to have a head, and each of its
that in Gifu, the “Meiji mergers” actually occurred in two distinct stages. However, given that there were
splits in between the two sets of mergers, there does not appear to have been any real commitment on the
part of the government to the mergers of 1874-76. Thus, in this paper, we ignore the distinction between
mergers that happened “early” and those that happened “later”, and compare only the initial pre-merger
boundaries with the final ones. The only exception is for the “early” mergers that actually took place before
our covariates were collected: for these, our dataset contains only the merged municipalities, and we thus
use these in our analysis. In one case, one of these “pre-merged” municipalities in our dataset was split, with
portions going to two new amalgamated municipalities. For this case, we place the entire municipality with
the amalgamation that received the majority of its surface area.
82These prefectural boundaries were not as new as might appear: they were initially constructed by
merging together historical provinces (kuni), whose boundaries had been generally unchanged for the past
600 years.
83The lowest level appointed officials, responsible for the koseki system discussed below, were drawn on to
form one type of consultative body (the kukochou kai). A separate body could be constituted via elections,
generally with franchise restricted to wealthy landowners (the min kai). According to one contemporary
report, in 1875 there were 23 prefectures with the former type of body, 7 with the latter, and 19 without either
(http://www.gichokai.gr.jp/hensen/01.html). These bodies continued in roughly the same form after the
“three new laws” of 1878, discussed in the next section. These laws established formal limits on the remit of
the assemblies: they were to deal only with matters of local taxation and expenditure, and could be dissolved
by the central government. The central government was particularly concerned that decentralization could
lead to factionalism and instability, and closely monitored the activities of the assemblies [Oshima, 1994, p.
34].
84Each sub-ward was supposed to consist of 4-5 towns or 7-8 villages.
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constituent sub-wards a vice-head (fuku-kuchou). It is unclear whether these new wards
were to replace the pre-existing local structure from the feudal period, or supplement it.
Suzue [1992] provides a survey arguing for the latter, even though official source documents
state that traditional local positions (shouya, nanushi, toshiyori) were to be abolished and
replaced by the ward head and vice-head (Grand Council of State notice 117, 1872), and that
the ward system established for resident registration, with its heads and vice-heads, formed
the fundamental local administrative system (Grand Council of State notice 146, 1872).
Regardless of the details, the system was revised almost as soon as it was in place: at an
1875 meeting (the dai-ikkai chihoukan kaigi) it was decided that both wards and sub-wards
were to have leaders and vice-leaders.85
The wards of the ward system do not appear to have been carefully designed to reflect
local cultural and geographic connections. One possibility is that the apparent lack of care
given to drawing these boundaries is due to the speed with which the system was imple-
mented. Alternatively, it may be an indicator that, notwithstanding official declarations to
the contrary, the ward system was never intended to function as the main system of local
governance.86
The authoritative description of municipal mergers during this period in Gifu is given in
the History of Gifu Prefecture.87 According to the 1872 Grand Council of State ordinances
and some 1873 Interior Ministry directives, individual villages that had low population or
limited land area were to be merged in order to prevent inefficient expenditure of pub-
lic funds.88 In discussion with the Ministry around May 1873, Prefect Yoshitsura Hasebe
planned on implementing this policy in Gifu by merging those villages that did not have
any inhabitants, and those that had originally been split due to manorial succession (jitou
koutai). The Ministry, however, requested instead that a detailed survey be performed, and
all villages with less than 50 koku (of assessed tax base) be merged because the burden of
municipal expenditures there was too great. A survey of ward heads and vice-heads, includ-
ing questions about potential mergers, was performed, and a set of mergers were carried
out by 1875.89 At the national level, however, a policy reversal had taken place, and from
85These were to be kuchou/fuku-kuchou and kochou/fuku-kochou, respectively.
86Oishi [1961] and Oshima [1994] discuss how the ward boundaries did not reflect the natural boundaries
of daily life at the village level. On the other hand, Tajima [1983] and Okumura [1984] provide examples of
prefectures where ward boundaries did reflect traditional local divisions. In some cases, historical go (five
household units) appear to have continued to be used for communication with the local populace, pointing
to the inadequacy of the ward system on its own: Kato [1979] provides an example of this in Bungo (now
part of Oita prefecture), as does the Noumin seikatsu hensen for Takizawa in Morioka prefecture (ch. 8 sec.
3.3).
87around p. 222.
88The target villages were chiseki kyouai or doguchi kishou.
89around p. 225.
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1875 onwards, it was decreed that no further municipal mergers were to take place without
a special reason.90
Turning to the public finance system, 1873 saw a reform of taxing authority under the
chiso land tax system, which at that time accounted for a majority of national revenues. This
reform changed the old in-kind tax system to a standard modern property tax: tax was to
be paid in currency, at certain tax rate, on a certain assessed tax base. The tax rate was set
at 3%. Tax base was initially assessed using agricultural production data, with the objective
that total tax owed under the new system should be roughly equal to that under the old
system. In addition, the tax system was extended to urban areas: Takayose [2002] provides
a detailed description of the new chiso, including its application to households in towns and
cities.91 Increased tax revenue was to be used for industrialization and militarization, major
objectives of the Meiji regime.
Public finance at the local level was regarded as clearly secondary in importance to
the collection of revenue for the national government. Here, the traditional minpi/kyougihi
(“people’s expenditure” / “cooperative expenditure”) system was maintained: this consisted
mainly of informal collections to pay for local public goods, organized and collected at the
local level, with enforcement carried out through social ties rather than the legal system.
Table 10 provides a breakdown of expenditures for a representative agricultural sub-ward.92
Personnel expenditures (for the vice-leader and messenger) totalled ¥1290, school expen-
ditures ¥495, and public works (roads&bridges, weirs, and flood prevention) about ¥305.
These line items made up 85% of total expenditures.
At the prefectural level, miscellaneous small taxes were used in addition to minpi, but
informal levies remained the backbone of the system.93 From 1872, the prefectural tax base
included prostitutes, geisha, and other related female employment Tomaru [2000]. From
1873 prefectures were allowed to levy a surtax on the central government tax base, but the
rates that were allowed appear to be quite low.94 Table 11 shows revenue and expenditure
for national and local governments during this period: although official tax revenue for pre-
90around p. 160-1. Source documents do not explain the reasons for this abrupt change. Wild speculation
might suggest the following: a realization that the ward system should be replaced completely by the 1888
municipal system might lead to the conclusion that the time currently being spent on changing boundaries
so as to better implement the ward system should instead be devoted to other issues.
91The primary source here is Finance Ministry notice 98, June 1873.
92This sub-ward was located in a fairly mountainous region, as evidenced by the wild boar line item.
93Officially, the official prefectural revenue sources were classified as levies (fukin) until 1874, and taxes
(fukenzei) from 1875 onwards.
94For details, see Table 10 of Takayose [2002]: for Saitama Prefecture in 1877, minhi was equivalent to
55% of national taxes, but prefectural (official) taxes only 2%.
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Table 10: Local minpi expenditures in Ward 1, Sub-ward 4
(Kouyama and 30 other villages in Suntou county, Shizuoka prefecture)
1875
Official vice-leader (fuku-kochou) salary ¥1014.000
Travel 100.600
Appearances at ward office 53.000
Writing brushes 22.695
Ink 9.420
Stationery (local paper) 23.120
“ (quality Saduka-gami) 37.145
“ (quality Mino-gami) 1.800
School 495.560






Weirs etc. (agricultural) 37.110
Flood prevention 63.300
Wild board abatement 6.500
Total ¥2459.706
Source: History of Gotemba City, p. 138-9.
Note: total should be ¥2459.715.
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Table 11: Revenue and expenditure, national and local governments, 1873-78 (¥1000s)
1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878
National tax 65,014 103,567 97,458 51,730 47,923 51,485
Prefectural tax 572 946 1,052 1,281 1,802 3,588
Informal tax (minpi) 16,238 17,467 21,339 23,436 17,785 14,212
Percentage national 79% 85% 81% 68% 71% 74%
(National) government expenditures 62,679 115,332 92,265 59,308 48,429 60,941
Official salaries 8,717 12,758 11,839 8,059 9,211 9,439
Local expenditures (minpi) 13,315 17,467 19,412 22,409 17,785 18,479
Prefectural tax expenditures 434 822 922 1,129 1,681 4,048
(National) government percentage 74% 79% 74% 65% 63% 66%
Source: Takayose [2000] Tables 2 and 3.
fectural governments increased dramatically in percentage terms, overall the revenue system
at the local level remained predominantly informal. The difference between the national
percentage in revenue and in expenditure reflects the fact that some local expenditures were
paid from national funds: we will argue that this is not relevant for the analysis in this
paper, because the transfers in question are much larger at the prefectural level than at the
municipal level, and in addition happen to be relatively small in the case of Gifu Prefecture.
Many aspects of the fiscal relationship between prefectures and municipalities are un-
clear for the early Meiji period, and sources often consider both levels of local government
together. However, according to Fujita [1939], the chiso tax system ignored municipalities.
The main assistance to local governments was through the traditional joubikin (“reserved
funds”) system, which was at the prefectural level. A fraction of taxes collected in each
prefecture (originally each han) was retained in that prefecture for local expenses, rather
than being transferred to the central government.95 The assistance provided through this
system was divided into “general” assistance (fukenhi hojo) and “specified” assistance (ho-
jokin), and a breakdown of these payments is given in Table 12. The “general” assistance
paid mainly for salaries and the operation of prisons. The salaries in question were likely
for personnel performing duties required by the national government, and the prisons were
holding criminals convicted of violating national laws. This portion of the assistance thus
corresponds roughly to a set of responsibilities delegated from the national government to
the prefectures. The “specified” assistance was intended to defray expenses for specific local
95Later on, the upper limit on this reservation system would be more strictly controlled by the central
government rather than by tradition, with the limit being reduced over time.
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Table 12: Assistance to Prefectures (¥1000s)
1876 1877 1878 1879
Salaries 2,453 2,703 2,823 2,699
Prisons 545 769 995 1,249
Other 711 504 295 458
Total general assistance 3,709 3,976 4,113 4,406
Public works 1,420 1,384 1,482 1,461
Maintenance 140 360 443 535
Normal schools 20 50 70 70
Elementary schools 700 425 425 361
(National) police 1,247 1,388 1,398 1,382
Prefectural police 834 1,629 1,480 1,247
Total specific assistance 4,341 5,236 5,298 5,056
Source: Meiji zenki zaisei keizai shiryou shusei vol. IV. This table is reproduced in Takayose
[2000] as Table 35, but with the units reported as ¥ rather than ¥1000s.
Note: some totals appear to be calculated incorrectly. “Other” line item is authors’ calcula-
tions.
services. These payments, however, were not made with the objective of equalizing revenues
or otherwise redistributing resources, but were instead based on a formula that considered
population and the amount of agricultural production.96 The intent thus appears to be that
the assistance payments should cover a fraction of the cost of providing certain services. We
will examine each of the major services in turn.
96Exceptions to this formula were made for prefectures with international ports or large rivers. See, for
example, Takayose [2000], p.164. The original source documents are available in the Fuken-sei shiryou.
Table 13: Prefectural police expenditures by source of funds, all prefectures (¥1000s)
1876 1877 1878
Official funds 1,961 2,994 3,041
Informal tax funds 1,120 1,369 1,599
Percentage official funds 64% 69% 66%
Source: Nakajima [1915], reproduced in Takayose [2000] as Table 39.
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Table 14: Prefectural police expenditures by source of funds, Gifu Prefecture
1875 1876 1877 1878
Official funds ¥6,540.381 ¥13,015.312 ¥14,279.950 ¥14,161.683
Informal tax funds 16,289.954 21,633.889 32,136.798 31,357.690
Percentage official funds 29% 38% 31% 31%
Source: History of Gifu Prefecture, Table 89.
First, Table 13 shows the source of funds for prefectural police expenditures. Takayose
[2000] equates “official funds” (kanpi) with funds from national tax revenue, and concludes
that the national government is paying for over 60% of local prefectural police expenditures,
with the prefectural government responsible only for about 1/3.97 He explains that this
division was formalized at an 1875 meeting, with the distribution of “official funds” to be
based on prefectural population. Data shows that, across prefectures, there were substantial
differences in the percentage of local funds in police expenditures. This data is shown
for Gifu Prefecture in Table 14: official funds cover only 1/3 of expenditures, rather than
the national average of 2/3. Source documents suggest that these differences have their
origin in the formulae used, which appear to have prioritized police in major urban centers
and important ports.98 Thus, the payments to “ordinary” prefectures lacking these special
features are lower than aggregate data would suggest.
Continuing, Table 15 shows expenditures on education. Here “official funds” are much
less important than for the police, covering less than 10% of total expenditures.99 Accord-
ing to the 1872 gakusei education policy, local governments were responsible for providing
education, notwithstanding their almost complete lack of formal tax revenue. Tsutsui [2005]
provides a detailed discussion of the situation in this period in part of Saitama Prefecture.
97Reality may have been slightly more complicated, as official prefectural tax revenue was likely included
in “official funds”. However, according to [Oshima, 1994, p. 117], this prefectural tax revenue did not exceed
1/20 of the informal minpi revenues, and thus Takayose’s conclusions stand because the percentages he
reports would not change materially with a more detailed analysis.
98An early source document here is Grand Council of State ordinance 16, 1883: this appears to set a
national assistance rate of 60% for Tokyo, and 30% for other prefectures. This may be related to distinction in
nomenclature between the police in Tokyo (keishichou, headed by the keishi soukan) and in other prefectures
(fuken keisatsu) that continues to the present day. Takayose [2000] (p. 83) compares the funding calculations
actually used, and compares them to a simpler formula based on population and surface area. He concludes
that there were additional subsidies to Tokyo (450%), Kyoto (350%), Osaka (350%), Kanagawa (70%), and
Hyogo (70%).
99There was a further drop in this even low level of support in 1882, with the abolition of assistance
payments from the national treasury. Strong national support for schools did not begin until 1918, with the
introduction of mandatory schooling.
79
Table 15: Elementary school funding (¥1000s)
1875 1876 1877 1878
Rollover/Savings/Interest 1,446 1,838 2,021 2,274
Informal tax 3,286 3,424 2,697 3,947
Tuition 356 393 358 362
Miscellaneous 497 501 496 485
Local tax - - 159 471
Official funds 609 546 449 444
Percentage official funds 9.8% 8.1% 7.3% 5.6%
Source: Chiba [1962]. This is reproduced in Takayose [2000] as Table 95, but with incorrectly
calculated percentages.








Books and equipment 20
Maintenance etc. 10
Total expenses 165
Source: History of Gotemba City vol 5, p. 304, following Tsutsui [2005].
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Table 17: Prefectural public works, source of funds (¥1000s)
1876 1877 1878
National funds 1,403 1,333 1,462
Local funds 2,595 3,221 3,913
Percentage national 35% 29% 27%
Source: Imperial Japan Statistical Yearbook, reproduced in Takayose [2000] as Table 40.
Table 16 shows revenue and expenditure for the Taiseisha school of Ward 1, Sub-ward 4.100
The interest revenue shown is from an endowment of ¥1000, collected through “donations”
that appear to have had substantial non-voluntary characteristics. The History of Gotemba
City (p. 314) reports on the case of Hagiwara Village, where an effectively mandatory collec-
tion was made, with the amount varying between ¥100 and ¥1, depending on the “donor”.
The vast majority of expenditures on education were thus local in nature, and, although the
details are unclear, appear to have been paid for via a proportional tax of some sort.
The third major type of local expenditure was public works. The 1873 Regulations on
River, Port, and Road Repair and Construction (kakoudouro shuchiku kisoku) established a
standard division between official funds and minpi for these projects.101 Table 17 shows the
source of funds for prefectural public works across Japan, with only about 30% being paid
for by the national government.102
Finally, there were administrative expenditures. Table 18 shows the breakdown in source
of funds for these expenditures for Gifu Prefecture. Unfortunately, there is no data available
from 1879 or earlier, so the table gives the three earliest years available. National funds
account for about 18% of expenditures. Furthermore, as shown by the comparison between
100This school was the 25th school district, serving the villages of Kamado, Hagikabu, and Numata. It
was built in 1874, and destroyed in a fire in 1877. During this period schools were sometimes operated by
groups of villages, although mergers due to the costs of operating a school were also common. A merger was
in fact proposed in this case, and would have involved four additional nearby villages, but it did not take
place. Although many mergers did in fact take place during the 1870s, according to Tomaru [2000] (p. 130)
these mostly involved villages with extremely small populations, and there was no general tendency toward
merging in average-sized villages.
101A rough summary would be that the fraction of funding from official funds depended on the size of the
project in question. 1st class and 2nd class projects received some official funds, but 3rd class and below
received none. The system was changed in 1875, such that regular maintenance would be paid for from
minpi, but official funds would be provided in the case of major damage. National funding continued as a
transitional measure until 1880, but was stopped thereafter.
102Kobayashi [1997], for example, emphasizes the importance of the prefecture in providing public works
in the case of rivers.
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Table 18: Administrative expenditures in Gifu prefecture, source of funds
1880 1881 1882
National funds ¥55,545 ¥56,484 ¥63,577
Local funds 145,232 155,023 159,582
Municipal funds 95,748 91,078 117,661
Percentage national 18.73% 18.67% 18.65%
Source: Imperial Japan Statistical Yearbook.
Notes: “Local funds” are defined as prefectural assembly funds, county and ward bureau-
crat salaries and travel expenses, within-area messenger and billboard expenses, ward head
salaries, and expenses associated with the ward head. “Municipal funds” are defined as town
hall expenses and assembly expenses.
police and education above, national funds are allocated more heavily to prefectural expenses
than municipal ones. Thus, national funding of administrative expenses for municipalities
was likely substantially less than 18%. Overall, it appears to be a reasonable assumption
that municipalities were responsible for raising their own funds to provide public services.
C.2 Meiji Local Public Finance, 1878-1888
In 1878 the “three new laws” were promulgated, regarding prefectural administration, county
and municipal organization, and local taxes, respectively. This was a major change from the
previous system of local government. This subsection describes the state of local public
administration during the period after these laws, up until the time of the 1888 local gov-
ernment act and the finalization of the Meiji municipal mergers.
At the municipal level, the ward system previously in place was generally regarded as
unsuccessful, the most common complaint being that ward and sub-ward boundaries failed
to accurately reflect either traditional cultural boundaries or the patterns of contemporary
daily life.103 Wards were abolished, and a system of cities, towns and villages was restored.
Towns and villages were grouped into counties, which nominally also provided public services
with their own bureaucratic apparatus. In practice, however, expenditures at the county level
were minimal, the positions that did exist may have been sinecures, and no public services
appear to have actually been delivered. Counties usually only appear in period documents
when used for communication, organization, or statistical purposes, and it appears that they
can safely be disregarded for the purposes of this paper.
103For example, see the discussion in Ido [1969].
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Table 19: Municipal revenues (¥1000s)
1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888
Property levy (chika) 7,311 8,502 9,235 9,508 9,529 8,791 7,546 4,891 4,594 4,728
Land levy (hanbestu) 684 689 1,083 1,110 1,118 883 587 261 192 176
Household levy 3,867 4,387 5,105 5,464 5,583 5,313 4,444 6,019 5,608 5,441
Business and misc. levies 713 892 988 1,324 1,012 371 364 559 595 590
Rollover and misc. 990 1,660 1,342 1,589 1,013 1,385 1,439 2,774 2,182 2,322
Percentage chika 53.9% 52.7% 52.0% 50.1% 52.2% 52.5% 52.5% 33.7% 34.9 % 35.7%
Percentage chika, Gifu 72.8% 70.9% 63.3% 64.9% 46.7% 50.3 % 50.1%
Source: Imperial Japan Statistical Yearbook. For Gifu, chika and hanbetsu taxes were not
reported separately for 1879-81, and thus the chika percentage calculation is omitted for
those years. Some population-based taxes were reported separately, and are omitted from
this table.
Under the new system, administrative boundaries were revised to reflect traditional di-
visions. The position of head (kochou) became a quasi-elected office, and in the view of
[Oshima, 1994, p. 34] the position was now likely to be occupied by the most powerful
members of the village.104
The new municipal system was implemented beginning in 1880, and, while it was a
substantial improvement on some dimensions, it also resulted in new problems. In Gifu,
24% of villages had 50 households or fewer, and another 36% had between 50 and 100.105
Establishing a modern administrative infrastructure using units of this size appeared to be
a challenging undertaking at best.106
For local public finance, a new local tax system was defined, including in particular a
newly created formal tax base at the prefectural level. No substantial change was made at
the municipal level, though, with the traditional minpi system left in place [Fujita, 1939].107
104The Interior Ministry itself reports the situation with a slightly different emphasis, stating that the head
is an official located below the prefect and (county) head in the administrative hierarchy, and needs to be
closely monitored to ensure that they carry out their duties faithfully (notice 80, 1878).
105There were even some villages with fewer than 10 households. Details are provided in the History of
Gifu Prefecture, Table 81.
106For example, in 1879 the prefectural assembly decided that all villages should have a village assembly,
with 10 members in the case of villages of less than 200 households (History of Gifu Prefecture, p. 402).
This was later revised downwards to 6 members, for villages of 300 households or less. Considering the costs
of communication and travel given in Table 10, it seems that small villages faced a high per capita financial
burden. A separate issue is whether there would even be 6 motivated householders present in a smaller
village.
107A rough translation of the government transcript in Ogasawara [1878] would read “with respect to mu-
nicipal expenditures, these are the responsibility of the residents of each municipality, are not categorized
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Table 20: Prefectural household levies, Urawa office, Saitama Prefecture (1881)
Total Levy (¥) Households Levy per Household (¥)
1st class 10.00 5 2.00
2nd 14.00 10 1.40
3rd 16.80 14 1.20
4th 57.00 57 1.00
5th 47.00 59 0.80
6th 22.80 38 0.60
7th 122.40 306 0.40
8th 12.30 41 0.30
9th 28.00 140 0.20
10th 30.30 202 0.15
Source: History of Urawa vol. 3, p. 59. Reproduced by Takayose [2002] as Table 38.
Municipalities used a variety of methods to collect necessary funds, but, as shown in Table
19, the most important sources were the levy on property, and the levy on households. This
property levy was strictly proportional, in the sense that it was collected as a percentage of
the assessed tax base for the national chika land tax. To avoid overtaxation, the ability of
municipalities to collect levies on the chiso land tax base was restricted after 1885, resulting
in a rise in the relative importance of household levies. The relative importance of tax
bases varied substantially across prefectures.108 The property levy appears to have been
particularly important for municipalities in Gifu, making up half of collections even in later
years. As the property levy was proportional, the proportional tax rate model used in this
paper is thus particularly appropriate in the case of Gifu.
as local taxes, and the collection methods are thus not stated in the regulations regarding local taxation”
(quoted in Oshima [1968]). As reported in Oshima [1994], Article 3 of the Local Tax Regulations states
that necessary funds for each municipality are left as a matter for the municipal residents to resolve “coop-
eratively”, and further implementation directives clarified that municipalities were free to use all traditional
means to collect revenues, including levies on households and property. There was no further government
interference until 1884, when in a further reform kyougihi (“cooperative funds”) were relabeled as chousonhi
(“municipal funds”).
108Takayose [2002] examines six prefectures in the Tohoku region, and compares the revenue raised by other
levies to that raised by land levies. In all prefectures land levies are the most important, with revenue from
other levies equalling 96% (Fukushima), 78% (Miyagi), 75% (Iwate), 74% (Aomori), 44% (Yamagata), and
41% (Akita) of the revenue raised from land levies.
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Table 21: Municipal household rates, Hyogo Prefecture (1880)
Total Levy (¥) Households Levy per Household (¥)
1st class 2.00 5 0.40
2nd 3.85 11 0.35
3rd 6.00 20 0.30
4th 4.50 18 0.25
5th 5.40 27 0.20
6th 3.45 23 0.15
7th 1.20 12 0.10
8th 0.65 13 0.05
unclassified 0 3 excluded
Source: History of Tatsuno vol. 3, p. 46. Reproduced by Takayose [2002] as Table 39.
Table 22: Prefectural household levies, Tsuyama Town, Okayama Prefecture (1908)
Households Levy per Household (¥) CDF
1st class 1 ¥67,000 2%
2nd 3 59,000 8%
3rd 1 52,000 10%
4th 2 44,000 12%
5th 6 37,000 20%
6-10th 23 19,496 34%
11-15th 98 5,305 51%
16-20th 372 1,851 73%
21-25th 531 833 87%
26-30th 1072 268 97%
31-33rd 1371 78 100%
exempt 4
Source: Sakamoto [1975], Table 13.
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The most important source of funds other than the property levy was the household
levy. This is sometimes viewed as a sort of (informal) poll tax; however, the literature
dealing with this levy shows that this is clearly not the case, and a degree of proportionality
was also used in assessing this levy.109 Tables 20 and 21 show examples of the amounts
collected via the household levy at the prefectural level and municipal level, respectively.
In both cases, the amount collected from a household varies according to the classification
of the household, which appears to have depended on the resources that each household
had available. According to Kashiwagi [1999], these classifications were done in an ad hoc
manner, by the head and other powerful members of the village, and thus may have been
devised to benefit the privileged. Circumstantial evidence for this can be seen by examining
a later tax table of the same form, shown in Table 22. The amounts in this table, from
1908, are such that the richest tax payer is paying approximately 860 times as much tax
as the poorest. In contrast, Tables 20 and 21 show the richest tax payer paying about 10
times as much tax as the poorest. Although there may have been an increase in inequality
between 1880 and 1908, and the table from 1908 deals with a much larger population, it
seems likely that the earlier tables are not equivalent to a strictly proportional tax on a
certain tax base, but have rather been set such that wealthier households pay less tax in
percentage terms. This is also likely given the electoral rules in place for municipalities. The
franchise was restricted to taxpayers, with wealthier ones receiving greater representation,
as will be discussed later.
Intergovernmental transfers continued to be of minimal importance at the municipal
level. Figure 26 shows the source of funds for expenditures at the national and local level in
1880. “General assistance” here corresponds to the salaries of certain personnel, the cost of
collecting taxes, and certain other functions delegated from the national government to local
governments. “Specified assistance” mainly consists of payments related to the construction
of public works, such as the maintenance of major roads or recovery efforts after disasters
[Oshima, 1968, p. 88-89]. Both the general and specified assistance payments were related to
the amount of work performed by the local government, rather than the availability of local
taxes to fund this work. In particular, there was no intent to have the assistance payments
act as equalization payments.110
As in the 1870s, there continued to be only a very thin relationship between the national
109There is some debate regarding whether the tax took into account extenuating circumstances of individ-
ual taxpayers or not, with Takayose [2002] quoting Shukutoshi [1895] in support of the former position, and
Minobe [1895] the latter. According to Mizumoto [1991], the calculation of levies was left at the discretion of
each municipality, and seem to have been often decided as a prix a la tete (mitatewari). Further complicating
the situation, there were some cases in which a poll tax was used: according to Takayose [2002], Saitama
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National Tax 5,526 
 
!
Other   810 
!
Specific Assistance 363 
!
Other   561 
!
Local Tax 2,698 
 
!
General Assistance 739 
!
Source: Takayose [2002] Figure 4.
Table 23: Municipal expediture by type (¥1000s)
1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888
Public works 6,382 5,473 4,039 3,672 3,135 3,336 3,282
Hygiene 794 699 656 453 704 496 480
Industrial promotion 116 110 199 247 296 323 432
Town hall / administration 2,690 2,718 2,672 2,304 2,526 2,916 3,092
Assembly 541 485 252 154 180 197 200
Education 6,568 7,142 7,729 6,095 6,153 4,475 4,492
Emergency assistance / misc. 1,600 1,326 657 634 688 751 720
Total 18,690 17,953 16,204 13,559 13,682 12,495 12,700
Source: Calculated from municipal expenditure data in Japan Statistical Yearbook.
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Table 24: Public education, source of funds (¥1000s)
1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888
Rollover/interest 2,274 2,480 2,376 2,395 2,061 1,855 1,477 1,406 1,201 1,401
Donations/misc. taxes 1,075 993 1,187 922 941 881 583 438 656 966
Informal levies (kyougihi) 3,356 3,581 4,453 6,037 6,988 6,850 6,961 5,501 4,146 3,971
Tuition 362 376 404 470 521 523 450 669 1,465 1,994
Local tax 471 823 1,069 1,309 1,504 1,534 1,536 1,401 1,274 1,197
Ministry of Education 444 470 203 - - - - - - -
Percentage informal levies 42.1% 41.1% 45.9% 54.2% 58.2% 58.8% 63.2% 58.4% 47.4% 41.7%
Percentage local tax 5.9% 9.4% 11.0% 11.8% 12.5% 13.2% 14.0% 14.9% 14.6% 12.6%
Percentage user fees 4.5% 4.3% 4.2% 4.2% 4.3% 4.5% 4.1% 7.1% 16.8% 20.9%
Source: Calculated from public education revenue data in the Japan Statistical Yearbook.
government and the municipalities. The transfers that did exist were mainly made by the
prefectures. Table 23 shows the distribution of spending by municipalities in this period.
Education and public works continue to be the most important line items. In both of these
cases, the data shows that contributions from higher levels of government were relatively
small.
Table 24 shows the source of funds for local public education. “Local tax” (i.e. prefec-
tural tax) accounts for about 15% of expenditures, whereas informal taxes at the municipal
level account for 50%. In addition, as in Tables 15 and 16, endowment interest is an im-
portant source of funding, and this generally has an original source within the municipality.
While there was a small amount of direct national government funding until 1881, from a
quantitative standpoint education was predominantly funded at the municipal level.111
The situation with public works was not as extreme as that with education, but the
predominance of local revenue sources is still clear. Local tax regulations during this pe-
riod eliminated national treasury payments for work funded by local taxes, thus making a
clear distinction between projects undertaken by a local government, and those controlled
directly by the national government.112 Officially, local governments also had some financial
and Kanagawa Prefectures had such a system near the end of the 1870s.
110Takayose [2002] states that “despite the increasingly clear differences in economic strength between
regions in the 1880s, the was almost no equalization of government fiscal resources.” He further notes
that there is actually a positive correlation between per capita local tax revenue and per capita assistance
payments during this period.
111The sharp increase in tuition near the end of the table is due to a change in government policy.
112National government controlled projects were generally major roads, bridges, and other large-scale basic
infrastructure. The national government also directly controlled maintenance once projects were completed.
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Table 25: Public works, source of funds (¥1000s)
1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888
National assistance 1,471 2,278 338 739 1,034 1,246 2,156 1,808 1,983 1,748
Local expeditures 4,640 5,231 7,691 8,717 8,215 7,827 8,026 8,399 7,802 8,160
Percentage national 24.1% 30.3% 4.2% 7.8% 11.2% 13.7% 21.2% 17.7% 20.3% 17.6%
(Directly controlled)
National treasury 208.2 133.4 119.6 248.2 331.0 460.9 514.2 307.2 810.2 741.0
Local tax 3.6 2.5 6.9 7.4 9.5 11.9 0.5 2.0 2.6 0.6
Percentage national 98.3% 98.1% 94.5% 97.1% 97.2% 97.5% 99.9% 99.4% 99.7% 99.9%
Source: Calculated from Takayose [2002] Table 58.
responsibility for national government controlled projects in their jurisdiction, but Table
25 shows that these payments were in fact minimal. Effectively, the national government
built certain public works by itself, and the remainder became the responsibility of local
governments. The data in Table 25 reports an average of about 20% of funds for projects
coming from the national government, but this figure includes projects directly controlled by
the national government. The fraction of national funding for local government controlled
projects is thus even less than this. Although detailed figures do not appear to be available,
prefectural funding for municipal projects appears to have roughly the same structure as
national funding for local projects.113 In both cases, projects were funded by the higher-level
government based on the characteristics of the project in question, rather than the ability
of the lower-level government to pay for it. There was thus neither a de facto nor de jure
equalization system in place in Meiji Japan.
C.3 Meiji Municipal Mergers
We end by reviewing the literature on municipal mergers in Meiji Japan: this consists almost
exclusively of case studies. We also comment on the incentives for these mergers.
Ido [1961] examines municipal mergers in Shiga Prefecture in 1873-4, and divides the
reasons for the mergers into three groups:
A To improve existing administrative boundaries that were unclear. (90 cases)
113Matsuzawa [2009] (ch. 6) reports on the situation in Saitama Prefecture as an example. In 1880, public
works regulations passed by the prefectural assembly restricted prefectural funds to only the construction
of bridges for national roads. However, in 1883, according to Directive 99, funding could be used for the
construction and maintenance of other bridges and roads as long as there were a public benefit. Municipalities
could apply through their county office, which would investigate and forward the results to the prefectural
government, which would evaluate the applications.
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B Agricultural land and population were too limited to expect the municipality to be
able to manage itself independently. (70 cases)
C Unclear. (86 cases)
Even in the (A) cases, there appears to have been underlying fiscal reasons for the
mergers as well, relating to the reform of the chiso land tax system and expenses incurred
performing certain functions delegated by the national government. According to Tanabe
[1963], in addition to the chiso reforms, the end of the 1880s saw an increase in expenditure
requirements for public schooling.114
Oguri [1953] examines correspondence between municipalities and the prefect of Saitama
regarding (undesired) municipal mergers, and groups local opinions into the following cate-
gories:115
C Unclear. (6 cases)
D Inability to agree on a name for the amalgamated municipality. (31 items)
E The municipal merger group is inappropriate from the perspective of water (for irriga-
tion). (30 items)
F There is opposition to the merger due to the “condition of the people”. (76 items)
All these reasons can broadly be categorized as “heterogeneity related”, with the water
issues directly related to geological or geographic differences, and the inability to agree on a
name due to historical differences. The last item is likely a euphemistic description of issues
regarding social class, possibly including cases where some lower caste (burakumin) residents
were to be added to an amalgamated municipality.116
Nakamura [1953] investigates the official 1889 merger report in Fukuoka Prefecture, and
finds geographic considerations predominate:
G In mountainous areas, mountain ridges and rivers were generally used as boundaries.
114The example given is that of Niita Village, in Tochigi Prefecture.
115For the purpose of counting items, any item of correspondence that refers to water issues appears to be
categorized as such, even if it also mentions other issues. Thus, the relative importance of water may be
overstated.
116Oguri [1953] also offers as a specific example a case that suggests a slightly different model. In Chichibu
County, Saitama, it was difficult to agree on an allocation of public funds between a flat area involved in
paddy rice production, and a more mountainous region involved in coal, silk, forestry, and manufacturing.
A municipal merger would thus be inappropriate, according to period documents. This case suggests a more
complicated model, as it involves differences in spending over public goods, and likely types of public goods,
whereas the model used in this paper involves only a single public good provided at a fixed quantity.
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H Rather than merging both banks of a river watershed, mergers concentrated on cases
where (irrigation) ponds and weirs were being used cooperatively by upstream and
downstream villages.
I Discrimination and differences in occupation led to difficulties in carrying out merg-
ers.117
Of these reasons, the first and last points can easily be thought of as heterogeneity, while
the second point suggests that there may also be some benefit from the internalization of
externalities regarding irrigation facilities.
Tanabe [1963] offers the following reasons:
J Different feudal lords, different tax rates, different traditions.
K Conflict over village financial resources.118
L Discriminated-against buraku.
Regarding the last point, Ido [1961] considers cases in Shiga Prefecture, and finds that in
most cases where a merged municipality subsequently split, buraku split off (or perhaps,
were split off) from other areas. In more recent research, Ioka [2000] examines the case of a
separatist movement in Taishou Village in Nara Prefecture (now Gose City), and shows that
this was related to discriminated-against buraku. Ioka (in his Table 2) compares different
parts of the village (at the oaza level), and finds that the household levy for discriminated-
against areas is remarkably low. This difference may have been due to basic differences in
income and occupation, but calls for “equality” in paying for public services appears to be
one of the causes of municipal partition.
Yamada [1966] looks at the example of Yoshino (yoshino-gou) in Nara Prefecture, and
finds that
M (Forestry) resource royalties made mergers difficult.119
According to Yamada’s Table 4, in 1891 these royalty revenues made up 65% of all revenues
in Kawakami Village. As any merger would have led to sharing this revenue stream, and
117Nakamura offers an example where an area consisting of the descendents of samurai was unwilling to
merge with another area.
118Specifically, iriai, cooperatives that controlled communal resources such as forest. An example was
given of Uenohara forest, control of which was split across 13 different villages, and in 1876 served as an
impediment to municipal mergers.
119This royalty system was established in 1871, and officially named kaisankin in 1876. There is also some
evidence for benefits from the internalization of externalities, particularly with respect to common natural
resources and irrigation infrastructure. Taking account of this, however, would require a substantially more
complicated model. We thus ignore this benefit from mergers in this paper.
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thus a reduction in per capita revenues, mergers tended not to be unpopular with those
villages currently possessing this sort of revenue. Although this is a separate revenue stream
from property taxes, and thus is not captured exactly by the model used in this paper, it
fairly clearly corresponds to the case where there is a richer municipality that is unwilling
to merge with a poorer one.
Finally, Morishima [1973] looks at Hiyoshi Village in Kyoto Prefecture, finding that
N Communal forest and pasture acts as a financial resource, and appears to encourage
the areas that possess it to engage in separatist activity
Overall, the literature regarding the Meiji municipal mergers appears to provide evidence
for the following costs and benefits of mergers:
1. Efficiencies of scale, including those in land taxation, education, roads and bridge re-
pair, irrigation, flood prevention, and communication with higher levels of government.
Merging with closely connected municipalities allowed for economies of scale in these
areas to be exploited.
2. Difficulties when merger partners differ in production activities (e.g. paddy rice vs.
dry rice vs. forestry), possibly due to difficulties setting rules for taxation. Similarly,
differences in geography, occupation, or income.120 Also, differences in class (former
samurai, burakumin) and differences in formal feudal lord. Access to particular addi-
tional revenue from, for example, forestry, also makes merging with other municipalities
more difficult.
Finally, in the case of the Meiji mergers, it was difficult for municipalities to merge in the
case where the amalgamated municipality would have a very large surface area. In moun-
tainous regions, this would result in excessively difficult travel within the municipality itself,
as mountain ranges would need to be crossed. This could lead to additional expenses or,
alternatively, could be thought of as causing non-pecuniary difficulties related to heterogene-
ity. In the case of flat agricultural land the difficulties appear mainly to be due to differences
in the resources held by different portions of a potential amalgamated municipality, or al-
ternatively differences in the sort of irrigation needed. For a variety of reasons there appears
to thus have been an upper limit on land area in an amalgamated area.
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Table 26: Election franchise weights, Takamastu City, Kagawa Prefecture (1890)
First class Second class Third class
Total tax paid by voters ¥1113 ¥1114 ¥1110
Election Day 18 March 1890 16 March 1890 14 March 1890
Name Votes Name Votes Name Votes
(10 seats per class) 1-a 48 2-a 161 3-a 316
1-b 45 2-b 150 3-b 249
1-c 37 2-c 110 3-c 246
1-d 37 2-d 97 3-d 240
1-e 34 2-e 92 3-e 212
1-f 33 2-f 88 3-f 204
1-g 31 2-g 77 3-g 197
1-h 30 2-h 71 3-h 192
1-i 29 2-i 70 3-i 191
1-j 29 2-j 59 3-j 190
Total votes 353 975 2237
Total voters 72 n/a 691
Electorate size 83 264 1119
Turnout 86.7% n/a 61.8%
Source: calculated from Nishiyama [2007], Table 3.
Table 27: Municipal Franchise, Tsuyama Town, Okayama Prefecture (1908)






Source: Sakamoto [1975], Table 15.
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C.4 Franchise Rules
Under the new municipal laws, the electorate in cities was divided into three classes, and
that in towns and villages into two. The total number of seats in the council was determined
by municipal population (art. 11, shi-sei). The franchise was restricted to men at least 25
years old, paying more than ¥2 in chiso tax or direct taxes to the national government. The
electorate was divided according to the amount of tax paid (art. 12, shi-sei). Table 26 shows
the divisions of the electorate in Takamastu City. The number of seats assigned is directly
proportional to the amount of tax paid. If, as previously argued, taxation is proportional,
then the electoral power is also proportional to tax base. This provides justification for the
modelling choice of weighting players by their tax base in the social planner’s utility function,
as these are the weights that appear to be accorded to individuals in the elections in this
period.121
With regard to the parameters introduced in the previous sections, β2 is not identified,
as player i always results in a variable cost of β2pi, regardless of partition. Thus, as a
normalization, β1 will be set to the fixed cost reported by the central government. The
appropriate value for the unidentified β2 parameter is then the variable cost reported by the
central government.
D Heisei Merger FInances
Weese [2015] discusses the financial transfer system in place during the 2000-2010 municipal
mergers in some detail. For simulations in this paper, we use a further simplified version
of the transfer system. Table C.4 shows that the calculated transfers during this period
correspond roughly to the fixed cost plus variable cost system in place since the Showa
period. Table 29 shows that the changes in the transfer system during the merger period,
designed to provide incentives for merging, correspond roughly to a decrease in transfers of
120Here it is difficult to determine what is the ultimate cause, as differences in geography might tend to
lead to differences in occupation.
121Table 27 shows the situation in Tsuyama, Okayama, in 1908. This table (combined with the population
data from Table 22) shows unequal electoral results in the municipality that implemented the comparatively
progressive tax scheme of Table 22. It thus seems likely that either the franchise was even more skewed in the
earlier period, or some regulations were put in place during the later period to require a roughly proportional
tax system. Kashiwagi [1999] describes the municipal tax system during this period as one characterized
by “arbitrariness and compassion”. Within a village, the rich and poor were connected in many ways other
than the tax system, and thus, even if it were possible, it may not have been in the interest of the elite to
tax the less fortunate at an extortionary rate, even if they technically had the political power to do so.
94
Table 28: Dependent variable is c(gS), cost of providing general services (’96-’97 fiscal year)
I II III IV V
(Intercept) 1294.6 808.4 834.3 792.2 902.7
(23.0) (24.4) (25.2) (27.1) (21.2)
POPULATION 136.4 136.0 136.6 142.3 142.5
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (1.7) (1.3)
AREA 4.3 3.6 3.8 2.9
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
INCOME.INEQ 0.04 0.03 -20.9 -12.4
(4.8) (4.9) (4.3) (3.3)
INCOME -1070.4 -779.8 -164.9 -483.4
(69.0) (104.3) (69.1) (79.8)
IS.CITY 324.1 369.8 -16.2 295.4
(54.9) (54.2) (59.2) (48.1)
POP * INCOME.INEQ 1.1 0.2
(0.1) (0.1)
POP * INCOME -30.5 -8.6
(1.0) (1.5)
POP * IS.CITY 5.4 -1.7
(2.2) (1.7)
PREFECTURE X X
N 3220 3216 3216 3216 3216
Units: ¥1,000,000 (roughly $10,000) per year. POPULATION is in thousands of resi-
dents, AREA is in square kilometers, INCOME is in ¥1,000,000 per capita per year, IN-
COME.INEQ is the coefficient of variation of income, IS.CITY is a dummy variable coded as
1 if the municipality in question is a city, and zero if it is a village or town. PREFECTURE
is a set of dummy variables for each of the 47 prefectures, with the restriction that the sum
of the coefficients on these variables must equal zero. Designated cities and special wards
are excluded from the regression because they have additional responsibilities devolved from
the prefectural governments, and thus have higher (and non-comprable) expenditures per
capita.
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Units: ¥1,000,000 (roughly $10,000) per year. POPULATION is in thousands of residents,
AREA is in square kilometers, designated cities and special wards are excluded as in Ta-
ble C.4. The sample is further restricted to those municipalities that did not participate
in a merger in order to have the same sample in both periods. Thus, the change in co-
efficients represents a change in national government transfer policy on the same group of
municipalities during the period in question. Inflation during this period was negligible.
Figure 27: Predicted and actual Standard Fiscal Need, Heisei data
"Standard Financial Need" of Japanese Municipalities
('96−'97 fiscal year)

























a lump sum of about ¥300 million per municipality, but the transfer corresponding to the
variable cost component did not change.
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